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BY

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PREFACE

THIS publication is based upon a course of six lectures given in Manchester College, Oxford, in October, 1914. The first four of these lectures, on "The Causes of European Wars," are here reproduced with some modification. The fifth was on "Our Duty during the War," and is here omitted as too ephemeral in its interest. What was the sixth, on "The Terms of Peace," is considerably altered, chiefly in consequence of the intervention of Turkey; and the last lecture here given, and the addendum, on an International Court of Honour, are new matter.

G. S.

RUSKIN COLLEGE, OXFORD.
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LECTURE I

THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF WAR

For a considerable time I have entertained the plan of offering a series of lectures upon what I may term the natural history of peace and war. For some years we have all felt that Europe was living upon a thin crust covering volcanic and eruptive fires. It was a condition which could not be properly described as peace any more than as war, that condition of armed peace, of fierce international rivalries and mutual dread. In these circumstances it seemed to me that there was great need of an attempt to study the problem in as scientific a spirit as possible, and yet that all the existing books on the subject were inadequate, for two different sets of reasons. On the one hand, they were all written in a more or less propagandist spirit, either from a definitely pacifist standpoint, or to prove a case for war as a permanent factor in human life. On the other hand, they were also, it seemed to me, all vitiated either by laying undue prominence upon the economic factor in the forces making for war, or by ignoring the economic factor altogether. Therefore, though

fully conscious of the inadequacy of my own powers to deal effectively with so difficult and so terribly important a subject, I felt that it was worth while to make my own attempt, and that it might possibly serve as a basis for discussion. This was my attitude of mind in the spring and early summer of 1914, and I had arranged to give a course of lectures on these lines in Oxford early in 1915. At that time I was of opinion that the danger of a great European War involving our own country, which had seemed so imminent in 1910, 1911, and in 1912, was already beginning to disappear. I thought that, owing to the wonderful economic revolution that has been going on in Russia during the past six or seven years, it had already become quite too foolish a policy for Germany or the Triple Alliance to engage in aggressive war against even the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, and that therefore the power of deciding whether Europe should have peace or war had passed into the hands of the relatively pacific States—France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. I do not think I was much mistaken in my interpretation of the economic situation ; but in estimating the effect of the economic situation upon the minds of those who control the policy of Germany, I was altogether mistaken, and those volcanic forces, rumbles of which we had felt under our feet, have now burst forth. The outbreak of war has completely changed the mental attitude of all of us. We are set furiously to think. We cannot, perhaps, attain the same scientific calm, but, instead, our

thinking has become more rapid and vivid, and the need of getting some result of our thinking has become imperatively urgent.

Fundamentally, therefore, the two questions that are pressing upon me, as upon all of you, are, What is our duty during the war? What is our duty in the making of peace? In the simplest language, I may say that our duty during the war is to make war victoriously; our duty in the making of peace, to make peace permanently. This, however, only provokes the further question, How can we make war victoriously? How can we make peace permanently? The first of these questions is essentially one for the naval and military chiefs, and for the financial and diplomatic heads of the State. The second one is emphatically a question for the historian and the sociologist, and to deal with it demands that preliminary scientific study of the forces for war and peace which I have desired to take part in.

The forces that work for war or for peace between nations seem to me to be capable of being classified under four different heads. Firstly, there are the biological forces which generated wars in early times, and which, to a certain extent, underlie war in the present day; and the somewhat cognate economic forces which are brilliantly but not adequately discussed by Mr. Norman Angell in "The Great Illusion." Secondly, there are forces arising out of conflicts of religions, and out of the inculcation of militarist and warlike ideals in the name of religion.

The third great root of war is the clash of the ideals of nationality or empire entertained by peoples and their governments. The fourth root of war is to be found in the sociological principle that a social necessity tends to create a social organization, and that every social organization acquires a sort of independent life of its own, which it seeks to further, even at the expense of the general life. The fact that war actually has been throughout European history a present reality or a danger has created a whole series of social organizations in the form of ambassadorial services, armies, fleets, arsenals, and gigantic firms manufacturing munitions of war for the purpose of waging war successfully, and these by their reaction upon the States concerned have tended continually to create the very dangers to provide against which they exist. I am not prepared to assert that this classification is exhaustive. It is, however, the best that I can make at the present moment.

Hunger Wars.

In connecting the evolution of human economics with war and peace, the broad fact is elicited that economic progress is closely linked with the development of partial peace and of a desire for peace. Purely hunting societies live by an occupation closely analogous to war, and engage in war easily and almost without feeling it to be any variation on the normal tenour of their life. The change from a hunting to a pastoral life strengthens the desire for peace, and makes war less constant, though still very

frequent. It is when men—or perhaps I should say women and men—set to work to cultivate the land, begin to have fixed habitations, to plant trees, and to accumulate household treasures, that the terrors of war become apparent to their minds. Within the range of countries which have a direct bearing upon European history, it was in Egypt and in Babylon that peaceful industry and effective agriculture were first established, and the influence upon social ideals of this economic progress is illustrated by the fact that the ancient Egyptian idea of heaven was of a country of flat and fertile fields, over which the blessed steered their ploughs drawn by beautiful and splendid oxen, and gathered bounteous harvests. From Egypt and Babylon civilization spread over Asia Minor and the basin of the Mediterranean, through the channels of the Hittite, Minoan, and Etruscan civilizations, and hence permeated Europe to an unknown extent.

The spread of this pacific civilization, however, did not prevent either internal or external wars. The whole Balkan Peninsula in particular has been continually the sport of a four-footed provoker of strife. Professor Geddes came to the conclusion, from his study of the Near Eastern problem, that "the goat is the devil of mythology, because he is the devil of economics." Thus, for example, the various Greek city states grew up in valleys surrounded by mountains, and attained their prosperity by intensive culture, and by the planting of vines and olive-trees. But the mountains surrounding

each valley were given over to the goatherds, who were continually tempted, when opportunity came, to feed their goats on the cultivated lands of neighbouring communities, which were continually being extended higher and higher up the slopes of the mountains. Quarrels and fights between the herdsmen of neighbouring valleys necessarily followed, spreading to the main body of inhabitants, and then, when these organized themselves for war, they found that the most effective method of carrying on war was to destroy the crops and cut down the valuable trees belonging to the enemy, and thus permanently to destroy the sources of his prosperity. This interrelation between the goatherd on the one hand, and the agriculturalist on the other, is the economic root underlying the political history of Greece. The importance of this goat-influence has in recent times been recognized by the Bulgarian Government, which severely restricts the keeping of goats.

But if the goat inspired the internal contests that cursed some of the fairest lands of the Mediterranean basin, it is the horse that symbolizes the wars of outer barbarism against the early centres of culture. Gradually during historic times, and most rapidly in the nineteenth century, the area of grassy steppes occupied by nomadic folk living upon horseflesh and mare's milk has contracted before the advance of the plough. Gibbon, who wrote before the days of railways, describes this area as extending from West to East for a longitude of 110 degrees, or a distance of 5,000 miles, from the Danube to the Sea of Japan,

and from North to South for a distance, in places, of more than 1,000 miles, from the Wall of China to the latitude of the reindeer.

To understand the significance of this area upon the history of Europe and Asia, it is necessary to realize the biological results of the change from a hunting to a pastoral method of life. Among primitive peoples who live by hunting it is customary for a three years' interval to elapse between the births of successive children; and should a child be born within this interval its life is generally sacrificed to safeguard the prospects of health and strength of the elder child. Obviously at less than three years old the child belonging to a tribe living upon the flesh of wild animals, berries, grubs, and wild roots, cannot be satisfactorily nourished without the assistance of his mother's milk. The hardships of life also shorten the child-bearing period, and the birth-rate, thus doubly limited, is usually approximately equal to the necessarily somewhat high death-rate, and is barely sufficient to maintain the numbers of the population. When, however, the hunters of wild horses had tamed them and could add milk to meat, and a new and suitable nutriment became available both for mothers and young, a revolution in the conditions of vitality took place. Births increased and deaths decreased, and the Malthusian theory of the tendency of population to increase faster than the means of subsistence, which so far from being universal is only exceptionally true, began to apply to humanity.

Throughout the pastoral horse-breeding regions there appears to have been going on in recent geological times a movement of desiccation and elevation of the surface of the land which has tended to diminish the amount of pasture available. This diminution has not been steady, but good seasons have alternated with bad. During the periods in which good seasons have predominated the grass has been abundant, the number of horses has tended to increase, and similarly the human beings dependent upon them. When dry summers and droughts have supervened the multiplied hordes of nomads have been driven forth into the cultivated lands to the east, south, and west, and they have gone forth as conquerors.

Most interesting studies of the people of the Steppes have been made by sociologists of the school of Le Play; but for our purpose the description given by Gibbon ("Decline and Fall," chap. xxvi.) is sufficiently accurate and vivid. His main thesis is that "the pastoral manners which have been adorned with the fairest attributes of peace and innocence are much better adapted to the fierce and cruel habits of a military life." He refers first to the results of a carnivorous diet, and while doubting whether that has a direct effect on character, he urges that the constant and open killing of domestic animals, and serving the bleeding limbs with but little preparation, must blunt the feeling of compassion. Then he dwells upon the military advantages of the pastoral life. Whereas corn has to be transported with

difficulty, "the active cavalry of Scythia is always followed, in their most distant and rapid incursions, by an adequate number of spare horses, who may be occasionally used either to redouble the speed or to satisfy the hunger of the Barbarians." Then the pastoral life is itself a training for war. "The individuals of the same tribe are constantly assembled, but they are assembled in a camp. . . . The flocks and herds, after grazing all day in the adjacent pastures, retire, on the approach of night, within the protection of the camp. The necessity of preventing the most mischievous confusion in such a perpetual concourse of men and animals must gradually introduce, in the distribution, the order and the guard of the encampment, the rudiments of the military art. As soon as the forage of a certain district is consumed, the tribe, or, rather, army, of shepherds makes a regular march to some fresh pastures, and thus acquires the practical knowledge of one of the most important and difficult operations of war." Such migrations, he points out, are made all the easier by the severity of the climate, which in winter freezes all rivers, so that waggons and cattle can cross securely. He then depicts the skill of the men of the Steppes in horsemanship, in the use of the bow and the lance, their abundant leisure and their habit of spending that leisure in the chase. "The general hunting matches, the pride and delight of the Tartar princes, compose an instructive exercise for their numerous cavalry." They surround a district of many square miles, and drive all the game

to one centre. "For this march, which frequently continues many days, the cavalry are obliged to climb the hills, to swim the rivers, and to wind through the valleys, without interrupting the prescribed order of their general progress. . . . Their leaders study, in this practical school, the most important lesson of the military art: the prompt and accurate judgment of ground, of distance, and of time. To employ against a human enemy the same patience and valour, the same skill and discipline, is the only alteration which is required in real war."

Thus there has been almost from the dawn of civilization incursion after incursion of pastoral tribes upon those countries which have attained a higher civilization. China and India have suffered conquests; but the Mediterranean basin has suffered most frequently. The historic militarism of the Old World has been the result of this conflict. Pacific Egypt, whose early social institutions seem to have been matriarchal, and whose original Kings appear to have been magical symbols of the life of the community, was overwhelmed by those whom they termed "The Shepherds" (*Hyksos*), but succeeded in organizing an effective resistance, which, however, transformed the social and political conditions of the country, and created a military despotism. Babylon, on the other hand, succumbed to the pastoral Assyrians, but equally there a military despotism was created. Similar incursions, whether of pastorals from Central Asia, or of other peoples of more settled habits and advanced culture, driven from their old

sites by the movements of populations originating in the horse-breeding area, again and again overflowed Asia Minor, the Balkan Peninsula, and Italy. The Roman Empire was the first effective organization of Mediterranean civilization for its defence against outer barbarism, and its fall before the attacks of Goths, Alans, Vandals, Huns, Arabs, Saracens, and finally Turks, brought this ancient struggle to its most terrible climax.

War breeds war, and the wars of more recent times count among their causes the unstable and chaotic conditions produced by conquests of more advanced civilizations by comparatively uncultured peoples. In some cases the conquered ultimately succeeded in conquering the conquerors; but this has notably not been the case where the Turks are concerned. Perhaps in consequence of some racial characteristic, perhaps merely because of the difference of religion, the Turks have always failed to acquire the civilization of their subjects, or to reconcile them to their rule, or to absorb them into their own body, or even to dissolve their social organization.

Hence, although Turkish dominion in Europe has lasted between four and five hundred years, it has never been accepted, and no peace is possible upon the basis of Turkish rule over Europeans. We have here one item in the long list of causes of the present war.

We have to note, however, that the original spring of so much disaster is being fast dried up. Just as the Western Empire of Rome when it perished left

in London a distant outlying station that remained unconquered by the barbarians, from which grew what we call the British Empire, but what might more properly be called the London Empire, or the neo-Roman Empire, so also before Constantinople perished Byzantine culture had found an outlying centre in the highway of commerce between the Black Sea and the Baltic at Kieff, on the River Dnieper. This trading centre became also a centre of industrial civilization, from which spread that most fundamental of the arts of civilization—tillage and the growing of corn. Kieff succumbed to the attacks of the pastoral nomads, but other cities, and notably Moscow, sprang up to take its place. When Constantinople fell before the Turks the niece of the last Greek Emperor of Constantinople became the wife of the Prince of Moscow. From Moscow as a centre Russian grain-growers spread, sending before them a protecting cloud of Cossack cavalry, but really conquering the land with the plough. In consequence of the Russian advance into the Black Earth district, which was Tartary, and is now South Russia, and their later advance into Siberia and Turkestan, introducing tillage and fixed habitations, the great scourge of the ancient civilizations, the periodic incursions of pastoral conquerors, has been eliminated from possibility. There are no more Zenghis Khans or Tamerlanes. The reservoir of Mongols and Tartars no longer overflows.

The wars of this type, which I have called hunger wars—wars caused by the pressure of increasing

population upon pastoral peoples incapable of increasing their means of subsistence, but all too capable of conquest—may truly be described as springing from biological necessity. But at the present time it cannot be asserted truly that there is any biological necessity for war. German sociologists have endeavoured to make such a plea for an expansionist policy for their own country at the risk of war and by means of war. They have urged that the increase of population in Germany and the limitations of her territories create a biological necessity for expansion. It is obvious that the plea fails, if merely because the world lies open to the German who finds it too difficult to make a living in his native country. It is curious, indeed, that we heard little of this biological necessity for expansion when German emigrants were leaving their country in great numbers, and it only appears to have been thought of since the development of German industries has enabled the increasing population to be absorbed, and emigration has declined to a very low level. The necessity, in fact, is not biological, but sentimental. The rulers of Germany prefer an expansion in population within rather than without the sphere of their authority. The sentiment is natural, but to dignify it with the term "biological necessity" is to say the thing which is not; and to regard this false necessity as a justification for letting war loose upon the world is a sophism on a par with the pretexts which tyrants in all ages have found for their most monstrous deeds.

Trade Wars.

In the history of Europe the desire not merely for the food necessary for existence, but for special economic advantages making possible the acquisition of wealth, has underlain numerous wars. In the Middle Ages the most important form of international trade was that in spices, which were collected in the East Indian Islands and in Ceylon, brought by Malay traders to the ports of India, there passed into the hands of Arab merchants, and carried by them to the markets of Baghdad, Damascus, and Alexandria. The profits of this trade enriched Constantinople, the cities of Italy, and the valley of the Rhine. Spices were even brought overland to Nijni Novgorod, and thence to the Baltic. Venice and Genoa struggled for maritime supremacy in the Mediterranean in order to reap the profits of this trade. Behind the Crusades, in addition to the religious motive, there was a distinct trade interest, and, during the period in which the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem was in existence, Jerusalem became a mart for the produce of India. When one trade route between India and Europe after another was closed by the spread of Turkish dominion, it was to capture the trade in spices that Prince Henry the Navigator began the exploration of the coast of Africa, and Vasco da Gama made his wonderful voyage round the Cape of Good Hope to the Coromandel coast. The same object sent Christopher Columbus across the Atlantic, and many a brave English seaman to

his fate in the vain search for a practicable north-eastern or north-western route to India. With these explorations and the consequent discoveries, commerce passed from the Pelagic into the Oceanic stage, and the rivalries of Genoa and Venice were repeated on a grander scale, as Portugal, Spain, Holland, England, and France successively entered into the conflict for maritime supremacy, commercial opportunities, and, incidentally, for colonial empire.

This series of wars appeared to be closed with the peace after Waterloo. Britain then emerged triumphant against all rivals, and not long after she had acquired and consolidated her Empire, she disarmed the jealousy of possible rivals by instituting her system of self-government for her colonies inhabited by people of European stock, by accepting for the whole Empire the principle that government must be for the benefit of the governed, and for these islands and for India the principle of free trade in her commercial dealings with foreign countries. And then she summoned the world to inaugurate the new period of international co-operation in industry, and friendly rivalry in the arts of peace, by opening the first international exhibition.

The hopes, however, of a world peace which appeared so bright when the first international exhibition was opened in London in the year 1851, was clouded, first by the series of European Wars beginning in 1854 and lasting till 1871, which marked the creation of the new kingdom of Italy and the new Empire of Germany, and later by the appear-

ance of a fresh economic motive for national rivalry and conflict. In the year 1851 railways only existed in the British Isles, in some of the longest settled districts of North America, and in some of the most advanced countries of Europe. Since then the world has steadily been railroadized. The Americans say that he who owns the transportation system of the country owns the country, and the maxim is full of significance and truth. When a country that is backward, but rich in natural resources, is "opened up," all sorts of opportunities for exploitation are presented to the financiers who can control the investment of other people's capital and the use of other people's knowledge. Hence the international scramble for "concessions," for the right to make railroads in China, in Turkey, in Asia Minor, in Persia, in Africa; the long conflict between England and France for political influence in Egypt; the more recent conflict between France and Germany over Morocco.

The influence of this principle upon international relationships has been very ably presented by Mr. Brailsford in his "The War of Steel and Gold," published not long before the outbreak of hostilities. He did not think then that the conflict of interests of the financiers of Berlin and Paris, or Berlin and London, would lead to actual warfare, though he regarded it as the chief cause of the continually growing expenditure upon armaments. I think he was fundamentally right, and I am not prepared to assert that any motive of this sort would have been

sufficient by itself to have provoked the present conflict. Nevertheless, such a motive was undoubtedly one important factor in the situation.

We cannot understand the origin of the present war without recalling the history of Germany's efforts at obtaining rich tracts of undeveloped country for exploitation. She turned her eyes first to South America, the quarter of the globe richest in undeveloped resources. There she was barred by the Monroe Doctrine from doing anything more than settle organized groups of her citizens on countries that remained predominantly of Latin language and civilization. She aspired to a share of Africa, and though Lord Salisbury and the British Government put no obstacle in the way of the acquisition of the immense areas of German West Africa, German East Africa, Togoland; and the Cameroons, yet all these colonies proved somewhat disappointing. The beginning of something that might have developed into a German Eastern Empire, comparable with the English Empire in India, was made by the extorted lease from China of Kiaochau; but its development was hindered by the jealousy of other States, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and by the unexpected renaissance of China. There remained the last and the most hopeful project, that of "pacific interpenetration" of the Turkish Empire by means of the "Baghdad Railway."

In this sphere German diplomacy won great triumphs. Great Britain, France, and Russia acquiesced in the passing into German hands of all

of the existing railways in Asiatic Turkey, and the control of the projected railways. To Germany hereby was ceded the future tutelage of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Syria, the seats of some of the most ancient civilizations, including great districts now desolate, which in past times have supported vast and prosperous populations. All these were being linked up with the railway-lines from Berlin, through Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, to Constantinople. Further, the Bosphorus being linked with Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, a new and shorter highway to India was on the point of being opened, and this was to be in German hands. Our Foreign Office had shown that it did not exactly welcome this development, but it had withdrawn all opposition.

Germans have long envied England the profits, which they perhaps exaggerate, derived by Britain from her rule in India, and they doubtless also are of opinion that those profits are insignificant compared with those which might be obtained if the natural resources of India were developed scientifically in a German manner. They probably, for instance, and with some reason, regard us as blockheads and ignoramuses for allowing one of the world's richest stores of energy, the streams that flow from the Himalayas, to run to waste. But whether or not a vision of German India was seen as the final terminus of the Baghdad Railway, that railway itself was sufficiently important as a stepping-stone to a Teutonized Mesopotamia and Babylonia, likely to become as wealthy as in the days of Nebuchadnezzar.

The strength of the chain is the strength of its weakest link, and the weak link of this railway-chain was where it traversed the country of the Southern Slavs. Hence it has been a cardinal object of German policy, all the more since the Baghdad project was embarked upon, that Serbia as well as Turkey should be the vassal of Austria as completely as Austria is the vassal of Germany. The two Balkan wars created an enlarged and victorious Serbia, strong in its alliance with the Russian Empire and driven into hostility to Austria by the existence of a Serbia Irredenta, twice as large and twice as populous as the little independent kingdom, and seething with discontent against Austrian and Magyar domination. It was therefore fully as much an element in the policy of Berlin as of Budapest or Vienna that Serbia should be crushed. The ultimatum to Serbia after the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand was sent in the name of the Emperor Francis Joseph; but the sending of it was sanctioned, if not decreed, in Berlin, to prevent the growing hopes of a great German Empire in the Near East from being dashed to the ground.

We have, therefore, to recognize the continued existence in the world to-day of economic forces tending to produce war, and the importance of this element among the causes of the present war. On the other hand, the still greater strength of the economic forces working for peace must not be ignored. The industrial and commercial activities of man surmount all the obstacles interposed by

political boundaries, and link all nations together in profitable co-operation. Absorption in economic interests produces a type of character which is unfavourable to militarism.

Economic Evolution and Peace.

It is obvious that the individuals whose economic interests are favoured by war are insignificant in number compared with those whose well-being depends on peace. The more widely property is diffused in any country, the clearer is the consciousness among the people of the desirability of peace; the more widely diffused political power, the stronger the political force in favour of a pacific policy. Unfortunately a pacific policy when pursued by some, but not by all nations, is no security for peace. It is a hoary lie that it takes two to make a quarrel. Either party can force a quarrel. A pacific policy on both sides is necessary in order that peace may be maintained.

With regard to our own country, I think it is pretty clear that offensive war against a formidable adversary had already become politically impossible before the end of the nineteenth century for purely economic reasons. The manufacturers, traders, retailers, small property owners, comparatively prosperous working men, trade unionists, co-operators, had become so conscious that war meant for them economic dangers and disasters, and their combined political power was so great, that the only wars that continued to be possible were those like the South

African War, generally expected to be an easy and trifling enterprise, or a war like the present one, imposed on us by the determination of the enemy.

The economic aspect of war has, on the whole, been admirably treated by Mr. Norman Angell, though on some questions, as in his dealing with the possibility of deriving a national profit from the receipt of a war indemnity, he slips into fallacies; but the prospect suggested to readers of "Europe's Great Illusion," that European wars would cease to be possible when nations realized the economic facts concerning war, were misleading. His great mistake lay in dwelling too exclusively upon the economic factor in political life, and, in particular, in over-estimating the power of the economic motive in determining the policy of Germany. Had his conception of the Modern State, as something that existed in the interests of private property owners, been as applicable to Germany as to England, France, and America, the hope which he excited of the end of great wars by a process of economic enlightenment would not have been so illusory. But the State in Germany is something finer and something more dangerous than that. The teaching that has done so much to mould British institutions and British policy during the nineteenth century, the teaching that the business of the State is to conserve individual life and property (and property rather than life), and the business of the individual is to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market, has never been accepted there.

LECTURE II

RELIGION AND WAR

Wars of Religion.

We are frequently told that wars of religion are things of the past. This is only true if the words "wars of religion" are understood in a narrow sense. The sense in which I propose to use the word religion includes any ethical beliefs or ideals adopted by considerable populations, or inculcated among them, in such a way as to influence their thoughts, emotions, and conduct. Using the word in this sense, the religious influences making for war or for peace are obviously supremely important to-day and demand careful analysis.

Quite apart from any definite religious teaching of a militarist or pacifist character, the influence of religious differences has been very great both in creating wars and in intensifying the bitterness of wars springing from other causes. In early days it was the complacent habit of tribal deities to take part energetically in all tribal wars on the side of their worshippers, and in consequence the greatest cruelties were regarded as religious duties when perpetrated upon the enemy who worshipped other gods. At the present time a great part of the world has outgrown tribalism

in religion, and we feel it somewhat of a shock to realize that the Kaiser believes in and worships a Deity whose special care it is to foster the Hohenzollern Empire and hallow all that is done for its aggrandizement, however atrocious in our eyes.

The development of world religions of a propagandist character, however, widened the scope of wars as much as it tended to diminish the frequency of war between neighbouring tribes of the same religion; and sectarian differences again, even among Christians, have made their own wars of religion, the results of which still remain. Thus those Party divisions in our own country which recently so nearly brought us to irremediable disaster, spring from the Civil War—essentially religious—of the seventeenth century between Cavaliers and Puritans, the disastrous and degrading effect of which historians are much too apt to slur over. The preaching of Protestantism in Northern Europe produced the wars of the Huguenots in France, the wars of the foundation of the Dutch Republic in the Netherlands, and, most important of all, the Thirty Years' War which ravaged Germany between 1618 and 1648. In this last it is calculated that two-thirds of the population was destroyed; those that remained were reduced from an extraordinarily high level of civilization and prosperity to utter misery, while internal feuds and divisions made the German people the sport of alien monarchs, like the King of Sweden and the King of France. It was only natural that in later years, when Germany began

to revive and Germans studied their own history, that unity at all costs became the aspiration of every patriotic German; and the realization of the terrible results of disunion is the root from which spring the moral power of Prussia, and the ready submission of the rest of the Empire to her arrogant and irritating hegemony. This national determination to maintain unity at all costs is a stubborn fact which our national policy will have to take into account.

Another still longer and still more bitter series of conflicts of hostile creeds is that between Mohammedanism and Christianity. The war of the Cross against the Crescent began as soon as Mahomet's Arab converts attacked the Eastern Empire; it continued while Mohammedan conquest spread through Africa and Spain to the Pyrennes, through the episode of the Crusades, and the Turkish advance to Vienna. This war has never ceased in the Balkan Peninsula. You might think me fanciful if I described our Soudan war, the French wars in Algiers, Tunis, Morocco, and the Soudan, and the Italian war in Tripoli as new crusades; yet I do contend that the most important cause underlying them is an inevitable conflict between Western civilization (whether it is or is not rightly termed Christian) and the Ethics of the Desert embodied in Mohammedanism. Be this as it may, all must admit that the existence of a continuous condition of open or disguised war between Christian and Mohammedan in South-East Europe, Asia Minor, and Syria, has acted as a continual irritant to the relations between the Great European

Powers, though for them a war over difference of creed would no longer be possible.

Religious Teaching on War.

Far more important, however, than either the indirect result of past religious wars or the present situation, or the association of religious feeling with national sentiment, has been the influence of definite teaching of pacific and warlike ethics. The later period of the Roman Empire saw the clash of four religions, each of which was marked by a fairly definite attitude towards war. The Empire was assaulted on the east by Mohammedanism, which regarded war as virtuous when it was waged on behalf of the faith, and held out to the warrior the prospect of a heaven of ease and sensuous pleasure. Over the frontiers of the Roman Empire there spread a form of Zoroastrian religion known as Mithraism, which taught that the universe is the scene of conflict between almost equal powers of good and evil. This was a religion that appealed specially to the soldier fighting in defence of civilization, but it gradually disappeared, partly superseded by, and partly absorbed into, Christianity.

The Roman Empire and civilization on the northern frontier were assaulted by the devotees of a religion more intensively military than either Mithraism or Mohammedanism. Both of these preached war for an ultimate end. Odinism preached war for its own sake. The heaven which it offered as a reward of virtue, the one virtue which it recog-

nized being to die on the field of battle, was Valhalla. In Valhalla, the heroes feast every night on the flesh of the heavenly boar, and drink till unconscious the mead that flows from the udders of the heavenly goat; in the morning they rise from their slumbers divided into armies, and fight until they are all hacked to pieces. Then, when the evening falls, their dismembered bodies join themselves together again, and their wounds are healed ready for another night of feasting, to be followed by another day of battle.

The theory is held by some historians, and I am inclined to think with great probability, though it became unfashionable when the school of Max Müller was in the ascendant, that the Odinist religion was the creation of an actual founder, just as much as Mohammedanism was the creation of Mahomet, and that it was invented and propagated in order to fill its barbarian adherents with the lust for battle. Be this as it may, the history of Northern Europe for hundreds of years is the story of a conflict waged equally in the field of battle and in the souls of men between Christianity and Odinism. The heathens overwhelmed the Christian regions and destroyed the western Empire, but the Christian missionaries penetrated to the remotest North and brought the conquerors of the Empire under the sway of the Church. One little incident in the most distant area of this conflict will perhaps illustrate its character better than any attempt at description. The Icelandic "Njala Saga" turns upon the death of

one of the first converts to Christianity in Iceland, Njal, known afterwards as Burnt Njal. Njal and his household had become involved in a feud with a neighbouring clan. One night when most of his men were away he was surrounded in his farmhouse by his enemies, who prepared to set the whole place on fire. Out of their great respect for Njal they offered him a free passage. He, however, found himself in a dilemma between conflicting duties. If he survived, his traditional code of ethics compelled him to prosecute the feud. His newly acquired Christian ethics taught him to forgive his enemies and to return good for evil. He solved the difficulty by refusing the offer of life; and refraining also from any blow in his own defence, he lay down on his bed beside his wife, who had refused to leave him. They drew the coverlet over their faces, and the story goes that when their friends sought for them afterwards amid the heap of ashes which represented the house, their bodies and faces were found untouched by the fire, dead, but calm and peaceful, and after they had been buried beneath a great mound, strange and solemn music was heard to proceed from it.

Much of the deepest interest of the history of the Middle Ages turns upon the continued conflict between Christian and Odinist ethics after Christianity had been nominally accepted. The Church had to accept warfare both public and private as a dominant fact. It had to compromise with Odinism and endeavour to control forces which

were too strong for it to overcome. Thus it enlisted the military ardour of professedly Christian knights, who had but little of the spirit of St. Francis, in the Crusades. It invented the Peace of God and the Truce of God. By the former, certain classes were protected from violence and slaughter—for example, women and labouring peasants—a victory for humanity which we thought till a few weeks ago had been permanently won throughout Christendom. By the latter, *private* warfare was prohibited during Sundays and other Holy Days, and the number of prohibited days gradually increased till there were only about sixty left in the year during which a baron without mortal sin could take up arms against his neighbour. The Truce of God was superseded by the growing power of royal governors, who substituted the King's Peace, prohibiting private warfare altogether.

But perhaps the greatest achievement of the Church in the direction of compromise was the development of the conception of chivalry, and the ideal of the "perfect, gentle knight without fear and without reproach"—a conception that is, perhaps, the greatest inheritance that has been handed down to us from the Middle Ages.

I have dwelt so long upon this ancient struggle between Odinism and Christianity because it is obvious that to Englishmen and Frenchmen, at any rate, the present war does appear as a revived conflict between Odinism on the one hand, and the sentiments and ethical ideals of chivalry and

humanity on the other. Germany is peculiarly associated with the worship of Odin. The great Odinist epic, the "Nibelungen Lied," has for its scene the Valley of the Rhine, and for its topic the contest for the fatal possession of the Nibelung hoard, evidently an accumulation of treasure from the sacked cities of the Empire. Germany was late in accepting Roman Christianity, and afterwards took the lead in throwing off the spiritual dominion of Rome, substituting another form of Christianity in Lutheranism, which eliminated the worship of the Virgin Mother and Infant Jesus; and even Lutheranism appears to be now practically dead. I am at any rate assured by my friend Herr Sassenbach, of the General Kommission of the German Social Democratic Trade Unions, that while Roman Catholicism continues to exercise some spiritual influence, Lutheranism has—or, at least, had up to the outbreak of war—none at all; and I am further informed that though expensive new Lutheran churches are continually being built, the money for their erection comes from the contributions of Jews who desire to conciliate the Government by subsidizing the Government religion. Certainly it appears that from the time of the Thirty Years' War to the present day there has been no effective religious movement conflicting with the dominant militarism of Northern Germany, and that no Christian teaching has ever eliminated from Germany the influence of its ancient pagan Odinism. Would it even be an exaggeration to say that Christianity is an exotic in

Germany which never really took root? and that Prussia, in particular, has ever been faithful to the God of War?

Here it is well to note certain historical reasons why the cult of War has been so powerful in Prussia. The present kingdom of Prussia was originally the electorate of Brandenburg, and the Electors of Brandenburg had originally been Markgraves—*i.e.*, Counts of the Marches. The Mark of Brandenburg was originally granted to a certain warrior known as Albert the Bear. He was posted in the bend of the Elbe, in the region which is still called the Old Mark of Brandenburg. He had to hold this outpost of the Holy Roman Empire in the centre of its most vulnerable frontier, midway between the mountains of Bohemia and the Baltic Sea, and directly in the path of the still more or less nomadic peoples of the great plain of the north and east of Europe. By conquest he extended his dominions from the Elbe to the Oder—this district forming the Middle Mark of Brandenburg—and east of the Oder over the New Mark. In the course of some centuries the three Marks passed to the Hohenzollern family, and the Markgravate became an Electorate. Still, Brandenburg lay as before in the midst of a plain, with no natural frontier to protect it either on the north, or south, or east, or west. Militarism was more pronounced than in any other German electorate, for its only defences were men.

In the seventeenth century, on the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War, the great Elector estab-

lished the Hohenzollern system of autocracy, a military organization providing for a very large army in proportion to the population, with specially severe discipline. He also secured the indivisibility of the electorate by establishing a law of primogeniture for the succession ; so that while other German states tended to break into fragments Brandenburg grew in area and strength. It acquired the detached region, East Prussia—a German state of an even more military character, established in non-German lands by the knights of the Teutonic Order—which was outside the Empire, and when the Electors became Kings they took the title of King of Prussia. Militarism became more and more a sort of State religion in Prussia. King Frederick William, the father of Frederick the Great, whose passion for drill and for gigantic soldiers is famous, wrote : "Desertion is from hell ; it is the work of the children of the devil. No child of God could possibly be guilty of it." In accordance with this maxim he proposed to shoot his son Frederick for trying to run away from his cruelty, and was only deterred by the intercession of neighbouring monarchs.

Frederick the Great's aggressive and successful wars, waged with unflinching determination against tremendous odds, and his cynical partition of Poland, added Silesia, West Prussia, and Posen to his dominions, and made the kingdom by far the strongest state in northern Germany. He has become a sort of patron saint to Prussia, as Joan

of Arc to the French. The Napoleonic wars, while temporarily humbling Prussia in the dust, prompted her to create her system of a short term of military service so widely enforced as to create a nation in arms. The final stages of the war also added a great portion of the basin of the Rhine to the Prussian Kingdom. Bismarck, again, played on a larger stage a part corresponding to that of Frederick the Great, and by three wars—waged in the period 1864-1871, each an aggressive war, each prepared for by diplomacy little trammelled by scruple, and each entirely successful—created the Empire of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia as we know it at the present day.

Hence we see how the whole of their history has tended to impress upon Prussians certain ideas of policy and political ethics. Firstly, the supreme importance of high national organization, of preparation for war, and of the devotion of the largest possible share of the nation's energies to military objects; secondly, the profitableness of successful war; thirdly, the unimportance of the public opinion of foreign countries; fourthly, the advantage of seizing a favourable moment to attack a neighbouring State. It is not surprising, therefore, that Von Rümelen and the fashionable school of German political writers from the time of Bismarck's triumph began to maintain the doctrine that there is, and can be, no international ethic; that there is nothing above the State; that the highest duty of the individual is to the State, and that the State should

seek nothing except its own aggrandizement. The general effect of the study of their own history, of the teaching of Nietzsche and Treitschke, and the practical acceptance of the discipline and traditional ideals of the army upon the young Germany of to-day, is eloquently, and with an extraordinary degree of sympathy, described by Professor Cramb:

"Nietzsche clears away the accumulated rubbish of twelve hundred years; he attempts to set the German imagination back where it was with Alaric and Theodoric, fortified by the experience of twelve centuries, to confront the darkness unaided, unappalled, triumphant, great and free.

"Thus while preparing to found a world-empire, Germany is also preparing to create a world-religion. No cultured European nation since the French Revolution has made any experiment in creative religion. The experiment which England, with her dull imagination, has recoiled from, Germany will make; the fated task which England has declined, she will essay.

"That is the faith of Young Germany in 1913. The prevalent bent of mind at the universities, in the army amongst the more cultured, is towards what may be described as the religion of Valour, reinterpreted by Napoleon and by Nietzsche—the glory of action, heroism, the doing of great things. It is in metaphysics Zarathustra's 'Amor Fati.' It is in politics and ethics Napoleonism. These same young men, who, in this very month, thrill with the scenes of 1813, see in Napoleon the oppressor, but they see in Napoleon's creed the springs of his action, a message of fire: Live dangerously!

"Kant's great Imperative was born of the defeats and of the victories of Frederick; echoes from Kolin and Kunersdorf, as well as from Rossbach, thrid along its majestic phrasing; it is moulded in heroic suffering, and brought forth in resignation and in grief that is overcome. But in the newer Imperative ring the accents of an earlier, greater prime, the accents heard by the Scamander, which even at Chaeronea did not entirely die away:

"'Ye have heard how in old time it was said, Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth; but I say unto you, Blessed are the valiant, for they shall make the earth their throne. And ye have heard men say, Blessed are the poor in spirit; but I say unto you, Blessed are the great in soul and the free in spirit, for they shall enter in Valhalla. And ye have heard men say, Blessed are the peace-makers; but I say unto you, Blessed are the war-makers, for they shall be called, if not the children of Jehovah, the children of Odin, who is greater than Jehovah. . . .'

"This conflict between Christ and Napoleon for the mastery over the minds of men is the most significant phenomenon of the twentieth century. You meet with it in England and in America, as in Austria and Spain. You meet with it even in Italy. In Russia Tolstoi's furious attacks are a proof of its increasing sway. The new spirit in France is an unacknowledged derivative. But it is in Germany alone that as yet Napoleonism has acquired something of the clearness and self-sufficiency of a formulated creed, above all in Berlin and in the cities and towns that come most within the influence of Berlin. . . . Young Germany, the Germany of to-day, in the writings of Treitschke and of the followers of Treitschke, studies Napoleonism, illumining politics with an austere and uplifting grandeur. In the writings

of Nietzsche and of the followers of Nietzsche they study the same Napoleonism transforming the principles of everyday life, breathing a new spirit into ethics, transfiguring the tedious, half-hypocritical morality of an earlier generation. . . .

"Corsica, in a word, has conquered Galilee.

". . . To Napoleon the end of life is power, and the imposing of his will upon the wills of other men."

This we may call neo-Odinism. Its kinship with ancient Odinism appears to be recognized—for example, one of the societies affiliated to the Pan-German League calls itself the League of Odin, and we have no difficulty in identifying the specially German god, the old ally of the Hohenzollern dynasty, with Odin.

Just as in the days of the fall of the Roman Empire the struggle between Christianity and Odinism had to be carried on both in the spiritual and the physical spheres, so now, while the troops of the Allies are battling in the trenches for the principle that there is such a thing as national morality, the decisive conflict must take place within the hearts of the German people themselves.

The inability of the German Socialist party to exercise any practical check upon the policy of the Government does not detract from the significance of their continual protest against the principles of neo-Odinism. The following is a suppressed article in *Vorwärts*, which is stated to have been printed in November:

"Man does not display all his strength and all his weaknesses save in exceptional situations. On the day of battle certain giants fall, like rotten trees before the tempest. The peoples, like individuals, reveal in times of crisis their hidden virtues or their unknown failings.

"The present crisis is terrible. . . . It shows us that the German people is stricken with a malady which, in the end, may prove fatal—and this malady is Jingoism. Thus one names a diseased nationalism which sees neither virtue nor courage in any nation but its own, and which has only insults and suspicion for others.

"Unhappily this disease appears to have seized on the German people at a time when the Empire was in a particularly flourishing condition, and it was in full blast even before this war broke out.

"When war was decided on, there was an eruption of Jingoism of the most feverish sort. Violent articles appeared in the Press. In the great cities inflammatory speeches were made, warlike poems were declaimed, and war-songs were chanted. The conflagration was regarded as a fête. The campaign was to be a simple promenade to Paris and to St. Petersburg.

"To argue the contrary was to risk being lynched. As soon as war was actually declared, the people of other nations were subjected to every insult. We were honest Germans; our adversaries were 'brutal Russians,' 'perfidious English,' 'insolent Serbs.' The mob tore down the signs of shops that bore a few words of English or French. As to who began the war, we were the innocent lambs, whilst the French, Russians, and British, were the wolves of the fable. Those who formerly had imputed to the Jews all the faults of our social state now discovered in England the cause of everything.

"At the first victory the flags appeared, the bells rang, perfervid speeches were delivered in public places. In the restaurants nothing was sung but 'Deutschland ueber Alles.' The public, hypnotized, recked nothing of the death-rattle of the wounded on the battlefield, of hundreds of villages in flames, of thousands of people robbed of all their belongings, of German families who awaited with anguish news of their sons engaged in the combat.

"Then one heard the atrocious details of the war in Belgium. The inhabitants had fired on our soldiers. The Belgians were 'assassins,' 'savage beasts,' unworthy of any consideration. They must expiate their crimes by sword and fire. No one troubled to explain the uprising of the Belgian people. Our perfervid patriots could not understand that a people must lose its calmness on seeing itself unexpectedly attacked, its fields laid waste, its towns and villages occupied, its men sacrificed in battle.

"Those who desire war ought to accept the evils that it brings. To be enthusiastic for war and then to descend to petty stories about dum-dum bullets is simply to grow besotted. Our Jingoes have yelled a hundred thousand times since the war began, 'The duty of every citizen is to defend his country to his last breath.' Those poor wretches of Belgium and France, have they done anything else? Have they not defended home and fatherland? If WE acted thus, OUR conduct would be heroic; on the part of our adversaries, it is rebellion and murder.

"Ah! don't let us throw stones at others, we who live in glass houses! Let us not look for the mote in our neighbour's eye, but take the beam out of our own. In this way we shall make the first step towards *l'entente internationale* and towards peace.

"Let us understand, then, that we are not merely Germans, French, or Russians, but that we are all

men, that all the peoples are of the same blood, and that they have no right to kill one another, but that they ought to love and help one another. Such is Christian, humane conduct. Man does not belong to one nation only—he belongs to humanity."

Even before the war, the world has noted the unceasing efforts of Kaiser Wilhelm II. to foster and intensify this ethical trend which I call neo-Odinism, and to combine it with a flaming devotion to the State and to the Hohenzollern dynasty. But it has hardly, in general, realized what a tremendous power for this purpose lay in his hands through the State control (which practically means the Emperor's control) of all University and school teaching, against which there has been but an ineffective counterpoise in the independent intellectual life of the smaller German states and the educational organization of the Social Democratic party Professor Geddes, a year or two ago, told me how he had been shown the equipment of Berlin University, and then being entertained at dinner, and being called upon for a speech, he thanked the assembled professors for many things, and most of all " Because you have taken me into your Holy of Holies, and there, in the innermost shrine of your University, you have shown me . . . *the Emperor's Jack-Boots.*" Then one grey-haired professor jumped up, and, with the greatest excitement, shouted, "Yes, we do worship those Boots; we would die for those Boots!"

Out of innumerable articles written since the outbreak of the war, dealing with the spirit of German

militarism, I select a passage for quotation from the first of two articles in the *Daily Chronicle* by Mr. Ford Madox Hueffer, on the educational policy of the Kaiser, and his personal responsibility for the ill-balanced condition of the German mind:

"No English officer could ever by any possibility expect a woman to get out of his way; or let us put it that no Englishwoman would ever think of getting out of an officer's way. But no German woman would ever think of not getting out of an officer's way, since, by doing that, in her humble manner she would be assisting in however minute a degree in the smooth rolling onwards of the mechanism of the State. In such a detail this process of State subjection seems absurd. But it will assume a different aspect when you consider that to-day Prussian women are really entering the drawing-rooms of Berlin, dressed in their gayest clothes, and, with shining eyes and elated faces, saying, 'It is my joy to announce to you that my son and my husband died the hero's death yesterday for their King and their Fatherland.'

"That is a terrible fineness; it has been produced by the generation-long discipline of stepping off sidewalks to let Prussian officers pass by; by the generation-long recognition of the fact that the State comes first, and that the first duty of the State is the waging of war. Who, then, is responsible for the present war? Undoubtedly, in a sense, it is the Prussian people—these women with the shining eyes, these officers striding along the sidewalks, these officials sleeplessly tinkering away at the smallest details of the State machine, and the Prussian people who willingly subordinate themselves, and who really believe that the highest and most glorious

function of a man—of *homo erectus europæus sapiens!* —is to die the hero's death (*den Heldentot sterben*) for King and Fatherland."

"Terrible fineness" seems to me exactly the right term. We have to remember that this German neo-Odinism, like all ideas which have forcibly swayed the minds of men, has its element of truth and moral appeal as well as an element of falsity and savagery. We have to confess just as much as the German puts himself morally on a lower plane than people of other States by his denial of any duty to humanity beyond the State, he is on a higher plane in that he does, to a far greater extent than we do, practically recognize and perform his duty to the State; and that German officialism for efficiency and honesty surpasses anything that the rest of the world can show. We have to confess that in ordinary times the average Briton, Frenchman, or Russian is a slacker compared with the average German. To leave on one side our Allies, Germany should make us ashamed of the extent to which we allow private interests to override those of the Commonwealth, and the quarrels of factions to imperil the general safety.

We also have to recognize that the evil element in these Prussian ethics has, largely under cover of German prestige, acquired an extraordinary vogue throughout the world, especially in England and in America. It is actually at the present moment announced that at the Oxford Union an unhappy young man is going to uphold the doctrine, "There are no

ethics in international affairs." The doctrine is ridiculous, of course. Leaving aside those conceptions of God and of Humanity, which almost all thinking men reverence, the mere fact that there are other nations, is bound in the long run to bring disaster upon the nation that refuses to admit any duty to its neighbours.

If now we attempt to summarize the results of this hasty survey, we find that while the influence of tribal religion and of differences between Christian sects in creating war may be treated now as negligible, and the war of thirteen centuries between Christianity and Mohammedanism is now at last wearing to its end, yet there still remains, as perhaps the most potent force making for international war, a certain ethical cult of Militarism which has Berlin for its Mecca. That the Kaiser Wilhelm II. is the High Priest of this cult may be admitted, but we need not exaggerate his personal responsibility. Herr Sassenbach told us last May, "In Germany *every officer in the army* receives the same homage and admiration as here you pay to an Oxford Blue." Necessarily the whole army is an organization for the promotion of a standard of values which leads to so agreeable a result; and the Kaiser's force springs from the fact that he is a true representative of the governing military caste.

But we must now attempt a deeper and more general analysis. For it is only in its peculiar intensity and in its particular form—*e.g.*, its close association with a bureaucratic system of government,

and a special docility of the civil population—that this Odinism or Napoleonism or Militarism, or whatever we may choose to call it, is specifically German or Prussian. Not only has it its devotees among all nations and at all times, but also it is obviously at bottom a perversion of ethical instincts that are essential to human nature—a perversion that results from exaggeration and the upsetting of the true balance by the ignoring of other essential principles.

I venture to suggest that popular phrase and fable, in which are frequently embodied summaries of the sociological thought and experience of many generations of men, give us a clue to the nature both of the instinctive roots of militarism and of the basis of the ethical forces which should control and balance those instincts. The phrase I refer to is the constant use of the word "virility" in this connection; the fable, that of the loves of Venus and Mars. One delegate at a recent Women's Suffrage conference dropped the statement "The male beast *will* fight," and I believe that most women will accept that as the fundamental truth about war; on the other hand, there is an unlimited store of proverbial wisdom laying the blame for enmity between men on feminine influence. If we may trust popular wisdom we must infer that the cult of War is an intellectual outgrowth from an emotional base, that base being part of a complex of instincts closely associated with sex. If this be so, it is equally clear that the desire for peace, the hatred of destruction, the detestation of wanton and unnecessary suffering, and, still more, of the

rising into dominance of the will to kill and wound and destroy, which form the emotional basis of the cult of Peace, are the natural psychological outgrowth of the maternal instincts.

The fortunes of the struggle, therefore, between the cult of Peace and the cult of War will depend partly on the effective force of the instincts behind these cults respectively, and partly upon the intellectual weapons of social or ethical or religious theory, which the evolution of human thought supplies on either side.

I have advisedly said "maternal instincts," not "instinct." If there were a single and indivisible maternal instinct inherited only by women, then the inference from what has been said above is that the hope of eliminating international war must depend on an increase in the influence of women in the affairs of nations, and particularly, in constitutional countries, on the acquisition of the franchise by women. That this inference is made by many is shown by the fact that, in general, the warmest male supporters of women's suffrage are keen pacifists; and the strong opponents are either militarists or men who fear that as a consequence of the admission of women to political power, their own country's defensive forces will be weakened to a dangerous degree. In reality, however, the relation between mother and child during the long period of dependence of the human young, has evolved not one simple instinct only, but a number of instincts of considerable variety, each separate instinct being a tendency to

respond to a particular call or stimulus, with a particular type of action and a corresponding emotion, and most of these instincts are equally inherited by both sexes. The inheritance by the male of instincts evolved from the maternal relation may with considerable probability be regarded as the origin of the family grouping, which, according to the greater weight of sociological opinion, dates from the arboreal stage of human ancestry; and the paternal relation so constituted again originates instincts, which also pass by inheritance to both sexes. The practical result on human character to-day we recognize by talking of "parental" and "protective," as well as "maternal," instincts.

It may be thought that all this leads nowhere, seeing it is talk about the deep-rooted forces in human nature which are not likely to change. The answer is that, while these fundamental instincts change either in nature or intensity only by imperceptible degrees, yet the most rapid changes can take place in the influence exerted by the emotions springing from them under changing social conditions. During the last forty years there has been over the whole of Western Europe an extremely rapid fall in death-rates and an equally rapid fall in birth-rates. The environment in which the fundamental instincts play has been profoundly modified. Year by year fewer babies are born; on the average, the more urbanized mother has to fear a more difficult and painful child-birth; with more sensitive nerves both parents suffer more from the troubles

and cares which parentage brings. Each individual infant on the average costs more in anxiety and mental effort, not only to his own particular parents, but also to the community at large, which exercises parental functions through sanitary inspectors, health visitors, schools and teachers, and State and local legislation and administration in many other guises. The lower the birth-rate and the greater the care spent on each child born, the less complacently will people look forward to the destruction of life on the battlefield, whether they think in the phrase *Kanonen-futter* or *Heldentot*.

Also, while fewer babies are born, each baby, on the average, stays longer in the world. With the decline of the death-rate, the proportion of old and middle-aged increases. The view of life of the old and middle-aged counts for more, relatively to that of the young, merely because there are more of them to count. In this way also, quite apart from any change in individual character, the mass-psychology of the nations is being changed speedily; the young may be just as fiery, but their fire has to encounter a greater mass of middle-aged caution and phlegm.

Again, while the innate characteristics of man may be regarded as for practical purposes unchangeable, the average effective character can be greatly changed by a change in educational methods. Kaiser Wilhelm, in the same year in which he dismissed Bismarck, instructed the teachers of Germany that it was their duty to provide soldiers of the right sort, and to combat social democracy. Germany,

like Sparta of old, set to work to foster militarism by education. But in this respect she was running counter to the general course of educational progress throughout the world, though, indeed, with such force as to create a considerable eddy, and to stimulate militarist tendencies in our own schools. Yet, I believe, the biggest change in the upbringing of boys throughout the English-speaking countries is in the opposite direction, though it is one which has been almost overlooked. From a period of unknown antiquity the education of boys has been dominated by the idea that boys must not be girls. For girls dolls were appropriate; it was right that in them the maternal instinct should be early aroused. But woe to the boy who wanted to play with his sister's doll! Suddenly that sex disability was, in effect, swept away. Mr. Theodore Rooseveldt stood for the Presidency of America, and Teddy Bears appeared in every home, to be loved and cherished by boys and girls equally. They appealed to instincts equally present in both. It is impossible to judge of the nature or extent of the future result of this new influence on the development of character; but we may be sure it will have its influence.

My general conclusion is that the effective force of the maternal instinct, the emotional basis of Pacifism, is, and has been for the last forty years, increasing very rapidly. It is also, I believe, a fact, and if so certainly a fact of equal importance, that the general trend of scientific thought during the past century has swept away what intellectual basis

there was for militarism, and supplied new arguments on the other side. The great scientific achievements of the eighteenth century were in the field of physics and chemistry, and Newton was the representative man of science, Newton the physicist, astronomer, and Master of the Mint. By the end of the century a science, or pseudo-science, of economics was built up, which justified war as one of the methods of checking the too great redundancy of population. But throughout the nineteenth century the greatest scientific achievements have been in the field of biology, and in working out the principles of heredity and racial progress. Consequently, except in intellectual backwaters, it is now recognized that the problems of human life must be considered with even greater care from the standpoint of eugenics than from that of economics. The working out of valid conclusions from that standpoint is one of the great tasks of the twentieth century, and we cannot anticipate the results. But already, in England, France, and Germany, people are thinking of the war in the terms of eugenics. War claims the best of the manhood of each nation—and destroys it. Each country may rejoice that its young men have shown that they can die the hero-death; but it cannot forget that war did not create their heroism, it was only the test that showed it was already there. War selects the hero for slaughter, so that the inheritance of heroism for the next and all subsequent generations is cut off.

Meanwhile war in its character grows with each example more grimly terrible—and less romantic.

LECTURE III

NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM

WHILE the present war arises partly from the conflict of economic interests, and is in greater measure a contest between opposing ethical ideals, it is primarily and directly the result of the clash of Imperialist and Nationalist ideals, of Empire against Empire, and of Empire against Nation.

A Polish sociologist, M. de Majewski, has enunciated a striking theory with regard to nationality. Reality, according to him, exists in four grades: Reality A, which is the Atom; Reality B, the Cell; Reality C, the Individual Organism; and Reality D, the Nation. The cell, he argues, is built up out of atoms, and the body out of cells, by co-ordination, and the creation of a union of a higher rank out of existences of the lower rank depends upon their adjustment to one another in co-operation and with differentiation. Human aggregations, therefore, to meet the test of being real social units, must be built up on those two principles of co-ordination in their activities and differentiation in their separate functions; and this can only take place through mental contact. Since mental contact again depends upon

language, language alone, and not government, religion or race, determines true nationality. Like all nice, clear-cut theories about human affairs this one is open to much criticism, and it attains its neatness and simplicity by emphasizing one element in a complex situation and ignoring others. But the element it emphasizes is of the first importance, and we may take it not only as representing the Polish view, but also as giving a clue to the creation of national sentiment in countries where it has recently developed.

It is indeed possible for true nationality to exist among a people though divided among themselves by language, as, for instance, in Belgium, which speaks French and Flemish; in Switzerland, which speaks German, Swiss-German, French, and Romansch. Fundamentally, what creates national unity is not a common medium of thought, but the possession of a common content of thought, and the memories of sorrows and joys shared in common may create a national unity in spite of differences of language. On the other hand, it would be difficult to over-estimate the importance of unity of language. We see at the present time the internal strain to which Switzerland is subjected through the tendency of German-speaking Switzerland to sympathize with Germany, and French-speaking Switzerland to sympathize with France. In the Balkan Peninsula the nineteenth century saw the development, in one State after another, first of a quickened desire for education, then the diffusion of literature through districts linked together by unity of language, and then on

the basis of the possession of a common medium of thought, the acquisition of a common body of thought, from which arose more and more imperative demands for the means of common action. If, then, we try to answer that question now so frequently put, What *is* nationality? I think we can best say that nationality is the result of the possession of a common body of thought which inspires a common emotion, and that a man is of the nationality to which he thinks he belongs.

The relation of the spirit of nationality to war depends much on the tone of the national feeling, which varies in character and intensity among the peoples of Europe. I remember, nearly thirty years ago, a Pole reciting to me his National Anthem, and the intense excitement that it roused in him. I asked him to translate it, but he would only tell me that its dominant thought was that of wading to Moscow through a sea of Russian blood. In countries like England and Russia, which have had freedom from foreign domination during the whole of the period in which they have possessed the consciousness of national unity, national feeling lacks that spirit of bitterness; while, on the other hand, in nations whose history has been one of subjection, like Poland and Ireland, it is lacking in the element of pride. But when a nation cherishes the memories of past greatness, of subjection, and yet again, of emancipation, then there is both bitterness and pride in its national feeling; and the highest level of intensity may be reached.

Such a history, I need hardly say, has been that of Italy and Germany; it is less recognized that it is emphatically that of Serbia. The time of Serb greatness, when Serbia held rank among the more highly civilized States of Europe was as far back as the fourteenth century. It was in the year 1389 that Serbia fell before the tide of Turkish conquest at Kossovo. Then followed centuries of slow degradation and impoverishment, varied by rebellion and massacre, till in 1829, with the help of Russia, a certain measure of autonomy was secured. Her history for the past hundred years has been one of most painfully slow, but yet continual, progress towards liberty and unity. A young Serb recently said to me that he feared that the crushing of the armies of his country by Austria was imminent, but in that case his people would revert to guerilla warfare, that they would never surrender. If on conclusion of war the Allies failed to realize the importance of the Serbian question, and endeavoured to settle it by compromise, such a settlement would only be the prelude for fresh wars. All that made life really worth living for him, and those who thought like him, was dependent upon the attainment of the complete unity and liberty of the whole Serbian race and the attainment of that greater Serbia which should include Slavonia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina.

I have already dealt with the motives which impelled the decision of the German and Austrian Empires that Serbia should be crushed. What we

have witnessed during these months displays in letters of fire the termination of her people that Serbia shall not be crushed, and that no Imperial ambitions of any empire whatsoever shall deprive them of their dearly won liberties, or induce them to resign their cherished hopes. Thus Imperialism meets nationality; and the collision plunges Europe into war.

Whenever such a collision takes place between a great empire which seems actuated by "the will to power" displaying itself in a will to expand, and a small nation that makes no claim for domination over aliens, but only demands freedom and unity for itself, it is the small nation that commands the general sympathy of humanity, and very emphatically our own sympathies when we are in the position of unbiassed neutrals. We glory in the memory of how Sir Philip Sydney died for Holland and Lord Byron for Greece, and of the Englishmen who fought with Garibaldi. We hear frequent references to the sanctity of nationality as a necessary link between the narrow circles of the family, and of personal friendship, which most easily draw out our affections, and the whole of humanity to which we admit a duty of brotherly love, but which baffles imagination by its multiplicity and the immensity of its moral distances.

No one, I imagine, has more nobly expressed this view than Joseph Mazzini. Out of many passages that might be chosen, take these from "The Duties of Man":

"O my brothers, love your Country! Our country is our Home, the house that God has given us, placing therein a numerous family that loves us, and whom we love; a family with whom we sympathize more readily, and whom we understand more quickly than we do others; and which, from its being centred round a given spot, and from the homogeneous nature of its elements, is adapted to a special form of activity. . . .

"In labouring for our own country on the right principle, we labour for Humanity. . . .

"Humanity is a vast army advancing to the conquest of lands unknown, against enemies both powerful and astute. The peoples are the different corps, the divisions of that army. Each of them has its post assigned to it, and its special operation to execute; and the common victory depends on the exactitude with which these distinct operations shall be fulfilled. Disturb not the order of battle. Forsake not the banner given you by God. . . . Say not *I*, but *we*. Let each man among you strive to incarnate his country in himself. Let each man among you regard himself as a guarantee, responsible for his fellow-countrymen, and learn so to govern his actions as to cause his country to be loved and respected through him. Your country is the sign of the mission God has given you to fulfil towards Humanity. The faculties and forces of *all* her sons should be associated in the accomplishment of that mission. . . .

"Never deny your sister nations. Be it yours to evolve the life of your country in loveliness and strength; free from all servile fears or sceptical doubts; maintaining as its basis the People; as its guide the consequences of the principles of its Religious Faith, logically and energetically applied; its strength, the united strength of all; its aim, the fulfilment of the mission given to it by God.

"And so long as you are ready to die for Humanity, the life of your country will be immortal."

The Nationalism that responds to these appeals—"Never deny your sister nations!" "Be ready to die for Humanity"—is, I am inclined to think, the basis of the hopes for the future of humanity of many people of European countries who are included under the loose name "Liberals." It is, for example, the idea which in the eyes of many of his admirers Gladstone stood for when he emerged from political retirement to thunder against the Bulgarian atrocities. The article quoted above from *Vorwärts* echoes Mazzini's thought, almost his phrases. The organization of the world into national States, each inspired by this form of Nationalism, is indeed a noble ideal.

Unfortunately we have to admit that there is also a baser and that a more familiar type—the Nationalism which demands liberty and integrity and sovereignty for itself, but for itself alone. Starting from Shakespeare, whose favourite hero was Henry V., the originator of one of the most criminal and rightly disastrous wars of aggression on record, we might go through the whole of our own patriotic poetry, and then through that of nation after nation, and find very little that is wholly free from the taint of either hatred or envy or scorn of the foreigner. I doubt if there is a nation with an organized system of education whose school histories do not in effect falsify the record of the national dealings with other countries either by omission or by unfair emphasis. This was

first brought home to my mind a number of years ago when for the first and only time I visited Versailles. Among the countless battle pictures I amused myself by looking for Crecy and Poitiers. They were not to be found; but I did find numerous pictures representing battles of that time which I had never heard of. I wondered then what sort of record of the wars of Edward III. the French schoolboy reads. Our boys get the impression that those wars were a brilliant series of English victories. But seeing that, as a matter of fact, the chief result of those wars was the expulsion of the English King from the vast French dominions which he had inherited from his ancestors, French schoolbooks may tell the story in a very different way, and yet not less accurately.

I need hardly point out that Nationalism of this narrow type is a potent force for war. So well is this recognized that the main effort of organized Peace propaganda has been directed to combating it, by promoting better acquaintance between nations, in the hope that mutual knowledge will lead at least to mutual respect.

But those who seek for international peace by way of a world of free, independent, sovereign nations mutually respecting one another's rights, and sinking hostilities in a friendly rivalry for primacy in service to humanity, find themselves face to face, not only with the British Empire, a somewhat solid fact, but also with a fairly clearly marked tendency throughout the world towards the aggregation of nationali-

ties into empires, and this fact it is fatal to ignore. We have to turn, therefore, to the examination of the nature of Empire and of Imperialism.

Professor Geddes has said that "every Empire is the Empire of a City." We may argue that this is an overstatement, alleging that it would be more correct to call the Austrian Empire the Empire of the Hapsburgs, or the German Empire the Empire of the Hohenzollerns, than to regard them as the Empires of Vienna and Berlin respectively. Nevertheless, the statement is generally true, and, moreover, we find that European empires derive their origin ultimately from the City-state of the Mediterranean. First there were struggles of the greater and more successful of the trading cities possessed of protected seaports, like Athens, and, on a larger scale, Sidon, Tyre, and Carthage, for wider spheres of exploitation; then Rome came into collision with Carthage, and gave the world not only the name, but a new type of the reality of empire. Professor Geddes suggested that an empire might be defined as the area exploited by a particular city; but here again we note that empires founded purely upon exploitation, however powerful in appearance, are built of iron mixed with clay. The secret of the triumph of Rome was that Rome possessed an ideal of imperial law and justice, imperfectly realized, no doubt, but still sufficiently powerful for Cicero to appeal to it and Virgil to boast of it.

We are accustomed to look upon the Romans as soldiers and conquerors who loved war and domi-

nated alien populations by the might of their legions. No idea could be farther from the truth. At the height of its power the Roman Empire, with a frontier of thousands of miles, stretching from the Firth of Clyde through the forests of Germany, the plain of Southern Russia, the borders of Persia, Arabia, the Sahara to the Atlantic Ocean, only maintained in the whole of its armies and navies about the same number of men as Serbia alone has been putting in the field in the present war.

The strength of the Roman Empire lay in the services it rendered to the countries that were comprised within it, and the true symbols of the Empire were not so much the Roman eagles as the Roman high-roads, aqueducts, municipal institutions, and the spread of the cultivation of the most useful plants and trees, and, most of all, that system of Roman law which is the foundation of the jurisprudence of the world.

On this account Dante, who was perhaps the most enlightened political thinker as well as the greatest poet of the Middle Ages, regarded the Empire as equally sacred with the Church, and selected for consignment to the bottom pit of hell as the world's three greatest criminals, Judas Iscariot, Brutus, and Cassius. There, in an atmosphere of the intensest cold, the devil perpetually champs with his teeth the supreme traitor of Christianity and the mortal enemies of the Imperial idea.

The Roman Empire fell, partly as a result of assaults from without, partly through certain deadly

causes of internal weakness. The spread of malaria in Italy and Greece sapped the physical and moral vigour of the peoples whose native civilization the Empire created and extended; and the development of great landed estates cultivated by slave labour destroyed the peasantry. Both these facts have their obvious moral for Britain. But far more significant for our instruction, as well as more pertinent to this discussion, is the third source of Rome's weakness. Rome failed to maintain the springs of local energy and public spirit. The Empire was, by degrees, entirely centralized. There was too little scope for disinterested activity between the individual citizen and the distant Imperial power. For lack of local public spirit and power of independent organized effort the Empire had no defence when once the Imperial legions failed to hold in check the attacks of the barbarians; and no doubt it was mainly because each part of the Empire desired to share as lightly as possible in the burden of defence, that the armies, as a whole, became inadequate for their task.

The Roman is the mother of existing European empires. This is true of the British Empire, for when the Western Empire fell and Rome itself was captured by barbarians, one distant city on the banks of the Thames remained unconquered. Though London afterwards was willing to acknowledge Jutish, Saxon, Danish, and Norman Kings, yet the political history of our country may be described as dealing with the spread of London dominion in

succession over England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, and the vast dominions beyond the sea. It is true of the Central European empires. The crowning of Charlemagne as the first Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire was the result of the desire of the Frankish conqueror to succeed to the ancient Empire rather than to destroy it. The "Holy Roman Empire" was perhaps never holy; it ceased soon to be Roman and became German, and the power of its feudal Princes was so much greater than that of their overlord, that it was no empire in the Roman sense; but it lasted from A.D. 800 to 1804, when it was converted into an Austrian Empire, thereby leaving a gap to be filled in 1871 by the creation of the present German Empire, which has learnt its aspirations partly from the Holy Roman Empire in its most brilliant periods, partly from the British Empire, and partly from Rome. As for France, in the reign of Louis XIV. Paris became an Imperial city, avowedly imitating and emulating the Augustan epoch. Napoleon was a copyist of Julius Cæsar, and since 1870 Paris has rescued Algiers, Tunis, and Morocco from Mohammedan rule, and begun to regain for them the prosperity and civilization which they enjoyed under Rome, and has carried the Latin tradition and civilization into regions where Cæsar's eagles never flew. Lastly, as has been pointed out above, the Russian Empire —the Empire of Moscow and of Petrograd—has the same filial connection with the Eastern Empire and with Constantinople as London has with Rome.

The Portuguese, Dutch, and to a less extent the Spanish, Empires, show a reversion to the Carthaginian type.

This strange fact about the Roman Empire that, when apparently destroyed, it springs up again in the form of many empires, is very significant. Does it mean that empire, like nationality, is a necessary phase in the evolution of human society?

Leaving that question aside for the moment, we note that Imperialism is a fertile mother of wars. There are frontier wars occurring in the progress of Imperial expansion, as the French, Italian, and British wars in Africa, and the wars on the frontier of India. There are the wars in which an expanding empire comes into conflict with a free nation, and endeavours to absorb it or bring it to a condition of subservience. There are the wars which result from revolting nationalities comprised within the sphere of a decaying empire, like the War of Greek Independence. Lastly, there are the wars of empire against empire.

The play of the forces of Nationalist and Imperialist feeling in the present war is most complex and various. In the first place, we have to note that while Imperialism is not necessarily irreconcilable with nationality, yet in the case of the Austrian Empire its very basis is the denial of nationality. The history during the nineteenth century of the Austrian Empire has been that of a continual contest between the two dominating nationalities, the Teuton and the Magyar, which finally have reached a sort of

insecure harmony, by combining to oppress the other nationalities which comprise the majority of the total population—the Poles, Italians, Roumanians, Czechs, and Serbs. Then, again, between Germany and France there is the issue of Alsace-Lorraine and the wounded national feeling of France. On the East there is the issue of Poland, that pathetic land, where true national feeling has been growing in intensity ever since national existence perished. Lastly, there are the three inter-Imperial struggles—that between Germany and France for the domination of Morocco; that between Germany and Russia for hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula; and that between Germany and Britain for the supremacy of the seas.

Good people, it seems to me, are apt to be a generation behind the times in their thinking. The aspirants after peace and human brotherhood have taken nationality into account, but hitherto, I fear, they have failed to grasp the power of the forces which are creating the political reconstruction of the world in great empires. Many of them seem to have no use for the idea of empire; they thrust it out of their minds, as something that disturbs their system of thought with regard to the great ideals they have adopted, and the plan for attaining them which they have conceived. It is a fatal habit of mind; it practically results in making a present to the Odinists of the growing forces behind Imperialism.

How rapidly these forces are growing may be judged from one or two examples. Sixty years ago

our statesmen thrust the Orange River Colony, against its will, out of the Empire, and compelled it to be independent. In the current phrase of that time the Colonies were regarded as a burden on the Mother Country. Twelve years ago we sacrificed £250,000,000, the lives of twenty thousand British soldiers, and over twenty thousand women and children who died in the Concentration Camps, and uncounted thousands of men, women, and children, who died on the veldt, in a war, the result, if not the object, of which was to bring the Orange River Colony with the Transvaal back into the Imperial circle. Bismarck, after the Franco-Prussian War, held that colonies were good things for Germany to encourage Continental rivals to possess, but undesirable acquisitions for Germany herself. Some twelve years afterwards either he was converted to the contrary opinion or overruled, and he acquired dominions many times as great in area as Germany in Africa and the Far East. Since then the German Empire in distant lands has grown, but not nearly so fast as the appetite for more.

I must ask your pardon for dwelling on such obvious and familiar facts, but we are apt to miss the significance of facts, sometimes in consequence of their very familiarity. Can you call to mind the appearance of the political map of the world now as compared with fifty years ago? At the present time the whole of Africa, with the exception of the rugged mountains of Abyssinia and the minute strip of Liberia, is parcelled out among the European Powers.

In Asia we have the huge dominions of Russia, Britain, and France, together with what may probably become a Chino-Japanese Federation, occupying almost the whole of that mighty continent. If we turn to the New World, we find even the United States drawn or driven along the Imperial road, and while the destinies of South and Central America remain a puzzle, we can have little doubt that they will involve, somehow or other, aggregation into larger units. Gibbon estimated the population of the Roman Empire at one hundred and twenty millions, and expressed the opinion that so great a number of human beings had never been united under any other single government. To-day by far the larger part of humanity is comprised in empires of a greater magnitude, and, apart from the present war, which may, or may not, hasten the process, the disproportion has been tending to become overwhelming.

The explanation of this as a development of the last half-century, is very simple. The tendency of empires to aggrandizement has always been in existence, but certain checks, very powerful in the past, have largely ceased to operate. The area which can effectively be ruled from a given centre is limited by the distance from that centre, but the distance must be reckoned not in miles, but in time; and not even so much in the time necessary for the transport of troops and supplies, as in that required for the communication of information to, and orders from, the governing centre. While the time required for

transport has been cut down, and continues to be cut down, by railways and steam navigation, that required for communication has been practically annihilated by the telegraph. In the centre of Africa and over the islands of the Pacific, the wireless station and the thin line of copper wire are the most significant symbols of empire.

But these revolutions in the conditions of transport and communication are only the removal of a check to Imperial expansion, the forces that create that expansion have still to be looked for. The word "empire" means, properly, "military command"—which is, perhaps, in itself a reason why Pacifists dislike it—and among the most powerful motives for expansion is the desire for military strength. In general, an increase in the size of an empire adds to its total force for war, though not at all in proportion to the increment. The British Isles have a population of some forty-five millions, the British Empire of some four hundred and twenty millions. The whole Empire is more effective in war than these islands alone would be, but it is very far from being nine times as effective.

On the other hand, we must not forget that one of the duties of a general is to prevent his soldiers from killing one another, and the Pax Romana or Pax Britannica is a fact which is not to be decried, either in its vast present importance or in its hope for the future. Think what this means—that in spite of all the terrible slaughter and destruction now taking place, all the belligerent States taken

together will probably have a greater population on August 1, 1915, than they had on August 1, 1914.

Now, one sort of Imperialism—a sort which inevitably provokes war—is in reality at bottom a narrow, aggressive Nationalism, desiring to stamp its peculiar features upon other races or civilizations. When we see this in action in Belgium it horrifies us, yet we have our own advocates in England of this very type of Imperialism. In one of the most interesting passages in Von Bernhardi's "Germany and the Next War," he quotes Lord Rosebery as having said at the Royal Colonial Institute on March 1, 1893: "It is said that our Empire is already large enough, and does not need expansion. . . . We shall have to consider, not what we want now, but what we want in the future. . . . We have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to take care that the world, so far as can be moulded by us, should receive the Anglo-Saxon, and not another, character." And most characteristically his comment is, "That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed." If Bernhardi could see nothing ugly in such Imperialism in an Englishman, it is scarcely to be expected that the general body of German opinion can see anything ugly in it when "German" is substituted for "Anglo-Saxon." And yet it is perfectly clear that the British Empire would now be on the point of crumbling to pieces if Lord Rosebery's type of Imperialism had been allowed to dominate

our policy completely instead of only perverting it occasionally.

To get to grips with the question as to what this modern Law of Imperial Expansion means for our hopes of peace, I think we must inquire into the psychology of Imperialism. The late Mr. Hubert Bland dealt with this subject in one of his articles in the *Sunday Chronicle*. Taking himself as an example of the typical Imperialist, he said, if I remember rightly, that he was full of affection for every subject of the Empire, but that his sympathies for all people outside were cool. If this introspection was accurate, Mr. Bland must have been a psychological miracle. It is natural to us to love a brother-Englishman more than an Italian or a Hollander; for it is easier to understand him, to realize his material sufferings and mental troubles, and that normal psychological fact is a real foundation for national sentiment. But how can you love a Kaffir as your fellow British subject merely because he sets up his kraal on the eastern side of Longitude 20 degrees, in British South Africa, and become quite indifferent to him as an alien if he happens to live a few yards away across that imaginary line, in German territory? I believe many of our Imperialists do try to cultivate this sentiment, but their geographical knowledge is not always equal to the strain. A few years ago some of our halfpenny papers which had poured obloquy on Mr. Keir Hardie during the South African War as a pro-Boer, later denounced him as a pro-Zulu. The writers unfortunately forgot that the Zulus are British

subjects, so that the Englishman who is not a pro-Zulu is an offensive sort of Little Englander.

The sentiment of Imperialism, in fact, is, to use a metaphor from chemistry, an unstable compound. It ends either to decompose into the simpler compound of selfish Nationalism, or to be a stepping-stone to a higher ethics. Whether the fact of empire is going to be a curse or a blessing to humanity depends upon whether empires are dominated by the narrow national spirit of one or more of the peoples who comprise them, or whether they can attain to broader and more comprehensive sympathies. And the question whether the British Empire itself is likely to survive hangs on the same issue.

When next Empire Day comes round, schoolmasters and after-dinner speakers may be recommended to take for a text Mazzini's words, with a special application: "Never deny your sister-nations in the British Empire." Never deny them just and equal treatment in act, or word, or thought. If they are European or Asiatic, never call them Hottentots. Never refuse to allow their national aspirations the same validity as your own. Above all, never attempt to penalize their language nor to force their manner of thinking into uncongenial channels; and learn to rejoice in the variety of achievement which becomes possible by the full development of the various natural gifts of many races of men of different climes.

If the British Empire stands to-day, it stands because at certain critical times those who ruled it

had their eyes opened and acted on those principles, as when Lord Durham gave self-government to Canada and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to South Africa, when it was resolved to give equal rights to the Boer Taal, and when the Government of India recognized the practice of adoption by native Indian Princes.

The passing out of the National into the Imperial stage of political evolution is to be regarded as a forward stride in human progress, which brings its own great dangers side by side with its possibilities. It demands a new ethical development, failing which it must needs be calamitous. But if human nature responds to the call, if we, for example, achieve real and effective sympathy for Cingalese and Punjabi, for the Arunta in the central desert of Australia and the Eskimo dwelling by Melville Sound, we are so near to the Christian state of mind of love for all men that the final transition should not be impossible.

Dante wrote "De Monarchia" to vindicate the claims of the Holy Roman Empire. He held that, just as all humanity should be gathered into one true and universal Christian Church, whose head must be a Vicar of Christ upon earth, all kingdoms and principalities and cities should form one holy and world-wide empire, whose Emperor must also be another Vicar of Christ, exercising a parallel dominion in temporal affairs to that of the Pope in spiritual affairs. Nineteenth-century thinkers preferred to look forward to union of the nations without such a

personal head, and expressed the idea in the phrase "the federation of the world." In whatever terms we conceive it, the imaginations of many of us refuse to be content with any political ideal short of such a unity. But facts appear to indicate that the destined path thither lies through the gathering together of larger and larger aggregations of humanity.

LECTURE IV

ARMAMENTS

One of the oldest maxims with regard to war that has come down to us is conveyed in the pithy question put by Solon to Crœsus when the Lydian King showed him his treasures of gold: "But how will you fare if some other King makes war against you who has more and better iron?"

In the history of war, as it is popularly taught, we hear a great deal—perhaps too much—about the military importance of the valour of soldiers and about the skill of the generals. The importance of numbers is also, to a certain extent, indicated. The importance of the control of the supply of weapons and of the material for manufacturing the implements of war is only fitfully recognized. Our schoolboys do have the importance of the part played by the English long-bow at Crecy explained to them; but when the Armada is dealt with the real factors that decided the issue are left obscure. There is a monument on Plymouth Hoe to commemorate the defeat of the Armada with the inscription on it, "He blew with His winds and they were scattered." This suggests that the weather was the decisive factor, whereas, in fact, the Armada was beaten by the English, and it was not until it was in flight that

it suffered from the storms. The secret of the defeat of the Armada is that the English ships not only were better sailers than the Spanish, but also carried heavier guns, so that they could keep out of range and yet bombard the enemy. I, for one, never knew this till I found it in Froude's history of the expedition collected from Spanish sources. In the naval wars of the seventeenth century against the Dutch it was again the factor of the conditions of manufacture of the material of war that decided the issue of the struggle. In numbers of sailors, seamanship, financial resources, and leadership the Dutch were in every way our equals; but they drew their timber-supply from the pine forests of the Baltic, whereas the English ships were built of oak, with the result that in the process of equal cannonading the Dutch ship sank first. In the great Napoleonic wars you have to go to military writers to find any mention of the serious handicap under which the French laboured for lack of saltpetre. Though they ransacked their country and dug up old stables and cowsheds, they could never get enough of this essential constituent of gunpowder to be able to afford supplies of ammunition for practising. The English troops were only moderately trained, but, in comparison with the French, the fire of our infantry was deadly in its accuracy.

While the influence of superiority in armaments upon the affairs of nations engaged in wars has thus been only inadequately explored, the part played by the same factor in determining whether war shall or shall not take place has been left in

still greater obscurity. I have referred, or example, to both the economic and the religious forces concerned in the barbarian incursions which destroyed the Roman Empire. It is quite possible that no less importance ought to be assigned to the activities of the traders who led their caravans from the Black Sea to the Baltic, and opened up trade with Sweden, and there found rich deposits of iron ore peculiarly suitable for the making of spears and swords. The maxim *si vis pacem para bellum* is obviously a mixture of truth and falsehood. It is a security to peace that countries which desire it should be believed to be ready for war. War becomes certain when the country that desires it believes its preparations are adequate to secure victory.

To all war preparations we can apply the broad sociological principle that a social need creates a social organization, and that the social organization, once it is created, acquires an independent life of its own, which struggles for existence even at the expense of the well-being of society. Because war has been an actual recurring historical fact, nations have been obliged to prepare for war and to create a great organization—Army, Navy, arsenals, fortifications, spies, to say nothing of diplomatists and Press bureaux. This organization, once created, is continually striving for its own aggrandizement. It is jealous of the expenditure of national resources for the purposes that elevate life and advance civilization. It is continually looking for evidence that its services will be required and its existence justified.

Now, the professional feeling of the Army and

Navy for its own aggrandizement is something which is fairly well understood, and which works mostly in the open, and which, therefore, the ordinary citizen is, to a certain extent, on his guard against, except in those countries in which, for historic reasons, the importance of a military element in society is peculiarly aggrandized. The Army and Navy in England have usually been kept in a certain degree of subordination, because they are national services, and while they yield salaries and pay to great numbers of men they yield profits to comparatively few. The case is different with the third factor in defence—the making of implements of war, from cartridges to Dreadnoughts. This, in the main, is done by the vast industrial companies which are more or less international in their organization, and which tend in each country in which they are established to develop practical monopolies. It is one of the dangers characteristic of this trade that the prosperity of a particular firm depends very largely upon its success in opening up foreign markets by bribing those who have influence on Governments, and the prosperity of the trade as a whole depends upon its success in fostering international hatred, jealousy, distrust, and mutual fear.

A great deal has been said, as, for example, by Mr. Philip Snowden in the House of Commons, upon the sinister significance of the great ammunition firms. The particular point that I wish to elaborate is the difference between the way in which this influence has worked upon England on the one hand and Germany on the other.

In Germany the greatest of the firms that supply munitions of war is Krupps', of Essen. It is said to employ between fifty and sixty thousand men, and it certainly has the very closest relations with the German Government. The dividends distributed among the proprietors exceed £1,000,000 per annum, and it is also able to spend great sums of money in bribery in various countries, and in fomenting militarist opinion in Germany. I imagine that we shall all be agreed that the firm of Krupps' exercises a very potent and malignant influence upon Germany. But yet we have to recognize that it has never sacrificed the military efficiency of the Empire of Germany to its own profits. For example, though it did enter into a contract to supply Belgian forts with guns that might be used against Germany, it did not for that sake of keeping faith with its customers arm those forts efficiently. The private manufacturer in Germany, having no State department to compete with him, has made it his first object to increase German expenditure on armaments to the maximum.

In England, on the other hand, the circumstances have been slightly different, and the policy of the ammunition firms has varied accordingly. Besides buying warships, guns, and the rest from private firms, the State has its own shipbuilding yards and factories, and before the South African War it was accustomed to provide by its own manufacture for its own needs to the extent of one-third, while purchasing from private firms to the extent of two-thirds. With this the private firms were not satis-

fied. Even before the South African War broke out the great engineering firms of the country that enjoyed Government contracts determined upon a campaign against the Government factories; and the profits realized through the South African War sharpened them in this determination.

The broad principles which had led to the adoption of the system in vogue had been the idea that, while it was convenient to utilize the resources of private firms, it was also necessary to maintain a system of Government manufacture in order that the Government might have a staff of experts capable of testing the quality of the private supplies, and also a means of checking the prices. The result of such checking has generally been kept a profound secret, but the people of Enfield succeeded in getting a Government inquiry into the cost of Government manufacture as compared with purchase. It was found that where the same articles were partly purchased and partly manufactured it was much cheaper to the nation to manufacture for itself. With regard to other things, such articles as were invariably supplied by private firms continually went up in price; such articles as were regularly manufactured in a Government factory continually went down in cost.

On the conclusion of the South African War a Departmental Committee was appointed, known as the Murray Committee, and, after consultation with private manufacturers, this Committee recommended that only the smallest possible nucleus of men should be retained in employment in the Government workshops. At the time the report was published, after

great reductions, there were 14,037 men so employed. The Chief Superintendent of Ordnance Factories reported that this number was not susceptible to any further reduction. Nevertheless, the Committee recommended that it be reduced to 10,600,* and that on the outbreak of war this 10,600 should be suddenly increased to 26,700. Those who were responsible for the internal working of these factories warned the Government that to increase suddenly the staff of the Ordnance Factories almost threefold would lead to a hopeless breakdown. Nevertheless, the Murray Committee and the War Office, under Lord (then Mr.) Haldane, resolved that it must be done, although they admitted that in the first all-important months of war the nation would have to rely, in the main, on the supplies from its own factories. When the War Office began to act on this report and discharge men wholesale, an outcry was made; and the case of the operatives commanded so much sympathy that a further inquiry was ordered, and a Conference, consisting of Government officials, three Labour M.P.'s, and two Members of Parliament, representing the interests of the private manufacturers, further sifted the matter. They reported that there was no necessity for the discharges, as the men and the machinery could be utilized in various ways in the Government service, and they added the significant warning: "*It will only be by utilizing the plant in this manner in peace-time that the country can look with any confidence to possess a body of workmen of sufficient number and suffi-*

* 8,000 in Woolwich Arsenal, 2,600 in Enfield.

cient training as will make expansion in time of emergency possible, without risk of failure from an excessive influx of strange and unskilled labour."

In spite of this authoritative declaration, the Government persisted in the policy of reduction of the staff of the Ordnance factories. It similarly also continually increased the proportion of warships built by private firms as compared with those built in the national dockyards. No explanation of this policy has been vouchsafed. Every remonstrance was met with vague talk about "economy," in spite of the fact that Government manufacture is the more economical system, by baseless insinuations that the critics of the Government were actuated by political partisanship, and by misleading expressions of sympathy for the men discharged.

So far as the general public was concerned, it was not found possible to make it understand that the question at issue was not whether a body of public servants should be thrown out of work, but whether the safety of the nation itself should be sacrificed to dividends.

The Government itself offering no explanation of its policy, those who remonstrated had to find their own interpretation. The following explanations were offered:

1. That the private firms, through the wide diffusion of the ownership of their shares, exercise great influence among Members of Parliament.

2. That by giving specially favourable opportunities for investment to Government officials, they can influence them to the peril of the nation.

3. It is pointed out that out of Woolwich Arsenal alone in two or three years some twenty men, occupying important positions, were taken into the service of private firms manufacturing munitions of war, receiving great increases in their emoluments. It is said that, in consequence, the members of the staff of the Government factories were induced to look upon their positions in the Government service as opportunities for making openings for themselves into much more profitable careers in private employment.

4. It is said that certain of these firms contribute to party funds.

Whether all or any of these statements explain the facts, it is obvious that they do not offer the slightest justification.

On one particular occasion with regard to certain torpedoes detailed charges of a most serious character were made in the *Woolwich Pioneer*, and brought before the personal attention of the Prime Minister himself, and these statements have never been contradicted.

The outbreak of war tested the policy of reduction to a mere nucleus of the men employed in the Ordnance factories, adopted by the Government on the recommendation of the Murray Committee. The expectation that had been held out that it would be possible immediately on the outbreak of the war to increase the number of men at work from 10,600 to 26,700, was found utterly delusive. Out of the many obvious difficulties which one proved insurmountable, we need not inquire; it is sufficient that there

was only a gradual increase, and the great immediate expansion of output from the Government's own factories, which was the basis of the Government's scheme for national defence, did not take place, though in course of time the numbers swelled to a much larger total than 26,700.

For me it was no surprise in August to see so repeatedly in the reports of the retreat from Mons and the subsequent fighting those fatal words, "The great superiority of the enemy in quantity of artillery." How much we have had, and shall have, to pay for the Arsenal discharges of 1906 and 1907 in loss of men in the initial stages of the war, and still more through the prolongation of the war as a consequence of the August disasters, and what France and Belgium have had to pay through the occupation of their territories, it is impossible to say. I have no doubt that but for the crippling of the Royal Arsenal in 1907, at least the French and British armies would have been able to carry through successfully the scheme whereby it was hoped that Antwerp would have been saved and its defenders linked up with the main allied army.

It is distasteful to have to deal with this sordid aspect of war, but it is necessary. It may be bad to wash dirty linen in public; it is much worse not to wash it at all. It is very disquieting now to remember that, in spite of Sir William Butler's efforts, only a poor pretence was made of dealing with the scandals of the South African War. The suspicion of fresh scandals, of enormous and unjustifiable

profits made out of war contracts, is already exercising a very powerful influence on the minds of those manual workers on whose skill and strength the existence of the British Empire depends. If the Chancellor of the Exchequer were in a position to announce that there should be, when the war is over, if not before, an inquisition into the whole subject of war profits, and that all increase of profits made by any British company or individual as a consequence of the war, should be taxed 20s. in the £, he would achieve something for the country's finances, and much more for the avoidance of strikes during the war. The principle of the British Army is that if you want men to face danger, you must say to them, "Come," not "Go." The same applies to the facing of sacrifice. Shareholders of firms drawing big dividends from war-orders, and calling in the name of patriotism upon artisans and labourers to work overtime every day and Sundays, and to abstain from strikes in any circumstances whatever, supply a spectacle to which only the pencil of Will Dyson can do justice.

It has been proposed that, in the making of peace, one of the objects sought should be the abolition in all countries of the private trade in munitions of war, and that this manufacture should in all countries be a Government monopoly. The facts, as far as I have been able to support them, indicate that that proposal should receive the support, not only of pacifists, but also of all Britons concerned for the safety of their own country.

LECTURE V

THE TERMS OF PEACE

WHEN war began, the prayers in our churches were for "a speedy, honourable, and lasting peace." Never in our time did prayers more truly interpret the aspiration of the people. There may be some variation in the emphasis which we lay on those three adjectives, but almost all thinking men will, I believe, agree in laying the greatest emphasis on the last. "We are not going to leave this for our children to have to do over again." And all over the country, wherever two or three people are met together disposed for serious talk, the discussion turns on this question, How can we make peace permanent? Shall endless wars still more wars breed?

Because war tends to breed war, because it rarely settles old issues without raising new ones which equally bear the seeds of conflict, this discussion must turn in the first place upon the problem of making such a peace as to leave the fewest and smallest possible provocations to renewed international antagonisms; and in the second place to the measures to be taken in subsequent years. Neither of these problems do I propose to consider from all possible or actual standpoints. I shall

ignore entirely what to my mind is the insane view that war is in itself desirable, and the foolishly pessimistic view that war, though undesirable, is an evil that can never be got rid of. I shall also assume, what seems to me to be clearly proved, that the British, French, and Russian Governments were each and all honestly and keenly desirous of preventing war, and that they were defeated in their efforts to maintain peace by the determination of the German Government that war should take place. There are some who admit this, and yet contend, like Tolstoi, that war can be ended, and can only be ended, by refusing to fight, and that German aggression should have been met, after the example of Ivan the Fool, by non-resistance. Apart from the question as to whether that is possible, human nature being what it is, past experience shows that the result of submission to Prussia has been that the State that has submitted has been put through the mill of Prussian organization and education and refashioned into a new engine for further aggression. To wage this war with determination in order to secure, if possible, a very complete victory, appears to me to be the clear duty of the Allies, terrible as may be the sacrifices entailed.

It has been urged in some quarters that there should be no humiliation of Germany. That we should love our enemies is not only the noblest, but also the wisest, advice that can be proffered to nations at war, just as much as to private persons entangled in antagonisms. Unless we love our

enemies, and sympathetically try to realize the whole situation from their point of view, we shall fail to understand them, and shall miscalculate both their strength and their weakness. But it does not follow that we should attempt to stifle the feeling of righteous indignation at monstrous wrong; and one wonders whether this talk of not humiliating Germany does not spring from a failure to apply the same principle of imaginative sympathy with Germany's victims. But I do not wish to criticize the sentiment behind this attitude, only to examine it in cold blood from the point of view of the permanence of peace.

Up to the outbreak of this war all efforts towards securing peace or mitigating the horrors of war, whether by Hague Conventions, or arbitration treaties, or neutrality arrangements, or in any other way whatsoever, have been based upon the assumption of the sanctity of treaties. This was necessarily so; and, when the war is over, there will be no possibility of building up an organization for peace which does not depend on that same assumption. But Germany, having resolved on this war, merely for the sake of greater convenience in carrying it on, tore up the most sacred treaties, and did so on the ground that no treaty by which she had bound herself would count for anything with her if it stood in the way of those ambitions which she chooses to call "necessity." The indispensable preliminary, therefore, to any peace policy must be the vindication of the sanctity of treaties. Had the United States and

other neutral nations seen their way to protest, and protest effectively, against the invasion of Belgium, a great forward stride would have been made. But, as a matter of fact, they made no protest, effective or otherwise; therefore the burden rests upon the Allies. It is now compulsory on them, in their own interest, in the interest of the whole of humanity, not excluding Germany, to see that, if they can possibly achieve it, the results of that chapter of events which opened with the violation of Belgian neutrality shall be a renewed and increased binding force in treaty obligations. That object cannot be achieved without bringing Germany into an attitude of repentance—repentance, that is, of the only sort that can be imposed on from without, a conviction that wrong-doing does not pay—but it must be a very deep and lasting repentance of that particular type. A better sort may then follow later, for German philosophy has always been ready to interpret the lessons of German experience into ethical maxims, good and bad. Now it is utterly inconceivable that terms of peace can be drawn up which should produce this repentance, which Germany will not feel to be humiliating in an extreme degree.

It is, of course, premature at this period to assume that the Allies will be able to inflict a sufficiently complete defeat of Germany by force of arms. Some people think that we shall never succeed in driving the Germans out of Belgium, but shall have to get them out by bargaining—offering, perhaps, the return of conquered German colonies. A nominal

peace of this sort would be no real peace, and the choice of policies before the Allies would be between different ways of continuing the struggle. We might return to the old method of competition in armaments, but henceforward with our eyes open, and acting in definite co-operation, and hoping, by simultaneously developing the immense resources of the allied dominions, to establish so great a preponderance of strength as to achieve ultimately by diplomatic pressure the essential objects for which we are at war—to compel the disarmament of Germany, and then to disarm ourselves; or we might proceed along the lines of the policy recommended by Mr. H. G. Wells, and, while nominally making peace, continue the struggle as a tariff war, forming a Customs Union with our Allies, and levying heavy duties on every import from Germany. Neither of these alternatives is pleasant to contemplate, but in the situation under consideration it would be necessary to face unpleasantness. It would have arisen through our failure to defeat Germany, and we should have to accept the consequences of that failure.

In such circumstances, the proposal of a tariff war would demand very careful consideration. It would presumably take the form of an agreement between the British Empire, Russia, France, Belgium, and Serbia for either absolutely free trade within the boundaries of this alliance, or for very light duties on each other's goods, a considerable uniform tariff on all goods imported from neutral countries, and a

very much higher tariff on goods imported from Germany and Austria. There might also be taxes on exports to Germany and Austria of goods in which the allied countries have more or less a virtual monopoly. Thus Russia could tax the export of rye to Germany, and the British Empire the export of wool. Further, efforts would be made to induce neutral countries, particularly European neutral countries, to join the alliance, whereupon they also would impose the penal tariff on German goods, and get the benefit of free trade with the Allies. The underlying principle would have to be carried out along other lines also. British and French capital would have to be used freely for the reconstruction, in the first place, of Belgium and North-East France, and then for the organization of cheap and rapid communications between all the allied dominions. The ancient sea-route by Archangel, for example, would have to be developed, the Russian railway systems—European, Siberian, trans-Caspian, and trans-Caucasian—linked up with those of India by way of the Persian Gulf, and the Channel Tunnel constructed. Further, the study of the French and Russian languages would have to be fostered, and all unnecessary barriers to inter-communication swept away.

It is easy to see that the passing and enforcing of the Tariff would be attended with great difficulties. The mere fact that it would favour many important industries and injure others would lead to internal strife. Then there are the more or less divergent

interests of the several allied countries. The enemy would not be idle, and would make full use of the many opportunities that would occur of aggravating discord. In neutral countries, the struggle between the Allies on one hand, and the Germanic powers on the other, would lead to very ugly developments. Imagine, for example, the position of Holland or Denmark, called upon to cut commercial connections either with Germany or with Britain, France, and Belgium. But war is always difficult and ugly and disastrous. The question is not whether tariff war is to be preferred to peace, but whether, in the event of real peace not being attainable, tariff war is not better than war carried on by slaughter. As long as that was really the alternative, and the fact that it was so was kept in mind, the difficulties should be surmountable, and the enormous preponderance in area, population, and natural resources of the allied Powers should put the result out of doubt. The result would involve the relative, not the absolute, impoverishment of Germany.

Let us now turn to the alternate hypothesis, and consider, if the result of the war is that the Allies are able to impose their own conditions of peace, what terms would be most favourable to the avoidance of future wars.

1. *Indemnity.*—The possibility of peace depending greatly on the question whether nations are prepared to govern their actions by considerations of justice, it is clear that the Allies should vindicate the purity

of their motives by refusing to follow the precedent set by Germany in 1871, and decline to make any profit out of the war. On the other hand, they are bound to seek the fullest obtainable compensation for the wrongs actually inflicted on the people of Belgium, France, Poland, and Serbia in districts occupied by the enemy. That is the minimum indemnity with which they have any right to be satisfied. The maximum indemnity which they might justly demand obviously includes the full costs of the war, and even for France a return of the £240,000,000 exacted in 1871, with compound interest up to date. Reckoning the interest at 4 per cent. per annum, this would approximately multiply the original total eightfold. To what extent it would be wise to abate the maximum demand, and treat the Germanic empires with generosity, it is, of course, impossible to discuss here.

If our Government exacts, as it is fully entitled to, the full cost of the war, then all the German colonies which fall into our hands must be returned. But if, in view of the feelings of South Africa and Australia with regard to German neighbours, it is considered necessary to retain any of these, those retained might be valued on an equitable basis—possibly the total expenditure sunk in them by the German Government—and paid for by a reduction from the indemnity.

The view has been expressed that at the end of the war Germany will not be in a position to pay any very great sum. This is a mistake. Germany, when war broke out, was enormously rich and rapidly

growing in wealth, and practically free of debt, as the Imperial and State railways and other assets yielded a clear net income far in excess of the interest on Governmental debts. From the point of view of private citizens Germany was both a debtor and a creditor country, using foreign capital to a considerable extent, but also owning vast foreign investments, and here also the balance was greatly in her favour. If Germany chose to cease her military and naval expenditure, she could pay an indemnity of two thousand millions sterling without being a penny worse off. As to how much she could pay without becoming seriously impoverished, without, for example, being reduced to the average economic status of the British Empire, a correct calculation would undoubtedly run into enormous figures. It is obviously an understatement to say that Germany's power of production is ten times as great as that of the United Kingdom after Waterloo. Yet our National Debt was then close on £900,000,000, and that did not cripple the national energies, nor stop the rapid increase in population and industrial efficiency. The inference is obvious.

2. *Rectification of Boundaries.*—The whole argument in Lecture III., if it is worth anything, goes to show that the guiding principle in the Congress of Powers, which will have to redraw the map of Europe, ought to be Nationality. This is the principle advocated by the "Union for Democratic Control," which is very actively promoting the discussion of the lines of the settlement. It is obvious

that the reality of peace and the permanence of peace must depend on people being reasonably well satisfied with the Government they have, and they cannot be satisfied with a system of government that runs entirely counter to their national aspirations. The particular way in which the said union proposes to apply the principle—namely, by a plebiscite—is open to very serious objections. There are regions of Europe where, if such an arrangement were announced, in a district where there was something like an equality of numbers, the rival nationalities would not stop short of wholesale murder to secure the verdict. It is possible, however, that the plebiscite method might be applied to Alsace and Lorraine.

In Germany, apart from Alsace and Lorraine, the two outstanding questions are Schleswig-Holstein and Poland. It is only the northern part of Holstein that is Danish in language, and the practical question to settle would be whether it would be best to draw the new frontier according to the present language boundary—that is, westwards from the Flensborg to the North Sea, or at, or even beyond, the Kiel Canal. The latter policy has obvious attractions, but if there is reason to suppose that the German population thus handed over to Danish rule would resent the change, Denmark would probably be wise enough to reject so dangerous a gift.

Russia has already announced her policy of creating a united and autonomous Poland, and presumably has done so with British and French assent.

Exactly how the boundaries should be drawn is, however, a question of great difficulty. Before Frederick the Great carried out the first partition, Poland stretched to the Baltic Sea, including the lower basin of the Vistula, now called West Prussia, and the city of Dantzig. To include this area would be to make future trouble through the fact that the district has now a predominantly German population; on the other hand, not to give the new dominion an outlet to the sea would generate discontent on economic grounds. Perhaps, as the Vistula is a great and not a rapid river, the problem could be solved by improving its navigation, so that a port capable of receiving ocean-going ships could be created on Polish soil, and neutralizing the river thence to its mouth.

The changes in the German frontier here discussed are comparatively slight, for the historical reason that the German Empire was built up on the principle of nationality. But when we turn to Austria-Hungary, based on the dynastic principle, and the denial of nationality, the transformation indicated by the national principle is extraordinary. A redistribution according to supposed racial affinities would add part of Galicia to Poland, and part to Little Russia; Bukowina, Transylvania, and considerable parts of Hungary to Roumania; the Trentino, Trieste, and neighbouring districts to Italy; and would assign to Serbia not only Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Slavonia, Croatia, and most of Dalmatia, the rest going to Italy. Then there would still be

the problem of the Slav populations of Bohemia, Moravia, and the adjoining portion of Hungary, numbering some eight millions, and forming a pretty compact mass in spite of numerous German villages and a large German and Jewish population in the towns. An independent Greater Bohemia does not as yet seem to be contemplated even among the Czechs; but as they are in numbers not very inferior either to the Magyars or to the Austrian-Germans, and have powerful organizations, they may demand autonomy and an equal status, and thus convert the dual into a triple monarchy. Subsequently, one is left to speculate what might be the influence on them of an autonomous Poland, with its kindred language, touching them on their eastern frontier.

Even this hasty sketch is sufficient to show how complicated must be the problem of straightening out the Austrian tangle on Nationalist lines; and I have left unmentioned the difficulties springing from the lack of any clearness or simplicity in the racial and language frontiers. For example, however sincere and unbiassed the desire to draw the boundary correctly between Hungary and Roumania, it would be impossible to avoid leaving both Magyars and Roumanians in considerable numbers on the wrong side. There is also, in the case of the Serb populations, the additional difficulty of religious differences; and it is very doubtful whether, if they were given the choice, the Roman Catholic section would not prefer to remain under Austria, rather than united with their kin of the Eastern Church.

Similar difficulties, greatly intensified, lie before

the Congress of the Powers which would attempt to deal with Turkey on the lines of nationality. The islands, including Cyprus, might, without any difficulty arising from the nature of things, pass to Greece. But Smyrna also is Greek, and much of the shore of Asia Minor; and Smyrna is also the port for a great hinterland, of which the population is Mohammedan and largely Turkish. If Smyrna be ceded to Greece, it would be extraordinarily difficult to fix on a satisfactory frontier. The success of Jewish colonization in Palestine ought to secure the opportunity for the creation of an autonomous Jewish State, which might gradually extend to the limits of Solomon's kingdom; but for the rest of the vast Empire there seems no possibility of forming separate States of Arabs, Turks, Armenians, Kurds, and the rest, capable either of decent internal administration, or of keeping the peace with one another. The rule of the foreigner seems the only possible solution. If there were any chance that the suggestion would be listened to, I should like to urge government by a Commission, the Chief Commissioner appointing his colleagues, and himself appointed by the President of the United States; this being the nearest possible approach to these newly-evolved American forms of government which have yielded the most brilliant results.

But I must urge, however fruitlessly, that a consideration that is only too likely to be altogether forgotten ought to be the guiding idea in the settlement of the Turkish Empire. These lands, together with Greece, parts of Italy, and Egypt, are the sites of the

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militarism in Germany and restore her to a proud and honourable place in the comity of nations. They consider that we can do practically nothing to assist such a change of opinion in Germany, but that it will probably come by the natural workings of the German mind. Many people who have intimate relations with Germany hold this opinion; and others who lay great stress upon the steady increase of the Socialist vote. There are others, including our militarists, and also Mr. H. G. Wells, who, while equally thinking that the German attitude of mind is outside our control, are altogether pessimistic about a victory for pacific forces in Germany, and look forward to an indefinitely prolonged period during which she will be gathering her forces for a renewal of the struggle. Universal military service and a continually expanding Navy are assumed to be necessary by the former group; while Mr. Wells recommends the Tariff war discussed above.

The first question, therefore, is whether we are justified in taking an optimistic view with regard to the future determination of Germany to live on good terms with her neighbours. This is at least doubtful. English people who have made friends in Germany have naturally in most cases come chiefly into contact with the section of opinion most disposed to be friendly to England, and are in danger of overestimating the numbers and weight of that section. As to the growth of the Socialist vote, it proves nothing. It is true that it has been swollen very largely by the support of opponents to the ever-

increasing armaments and the aggressive and provocative foreign policy of the Government, but there is no indication that the number of these pacific voters was increasing, but only that to an increasing extent they were driven into voting for the Socialist party, because it was the only genuine anti-Government party. The fact that all the other parties were becoming more and more united in their support of despotism at home and war abroad, combined with the increasing timidity of the Socialists, completely negative any favourable inferences which might be drawn from the increase of the Socialist vote.

Is it, however, beyond doubt that we must consider it impossible to influence German opinion?

Of policies based upon the opposite idea there are three that I know of. The first is that of the No Humiliation school. These desire that the war should end in a draw rather than in victory. The more extreme of them would confirm Germany in the possession of Alsace and Lorraine and all her other dominions, would veto the unification of Poland, inflict no indemnity, and even in the more extreme cases propose that Great Britain should bear the cost of restoring Belgium once more to prosperity. They hope that such touching magnanimity would melt the hearts of the German General Staff. It is a view about which it is impossible to argue. Those who hold it would also perhaps apply a similar view to cases of individuals, and put convicted burglars in positions of trust. They are, fortunately perhaps, in the minority.

Quite early in the course of the war the idea was suggested, which I, for one, welcomed with great hopefulness, that the German Empire might be split into its constituent states and the Kingdom of Prussia subdivided, and each fragment be given a completely democratic constitution, with full liberty to all subsequently to confederate and form any sort of union they chose, except that of a Hohenzollern Empire. I regret to say that I have ceased to regard this as possible. The work of unification on the existing lines appears, from the accounts received of the state of feeling in various parts of Germany, to have been done too thoroughly.

A similar idea is urged by Mr. Charles E. Innes. "Destroy the present form of Germany, root and branch, and grant to the German nation a democratic form of government, with the sovereign power and responsibility vested in the people," with the condition: "That it shall join with the Allies, and participate in a defensive alliance against any and every aggressive nation from now henceforth, and it shall disown any intention of self-aggrandizement at the expense of any other nation."

With regard to the suggested condition, it seems to me that it would either be superfluous or futile; superfluous if a democratized Germany ceases to be aggressive, futile if it does not. The main proposition can be discussed quite apart from this addendum. It can be taken as a possible interpretation of Mr. Asquith's inspiring, but somewhat cryptic, declaration: "We shall not sheathe the sword . . . until

the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." Necessarily that cannot be done unless it is destroyed in Germany, even in Prussia itself; it can only be destroyed by being superseded, and the only supersession we could contemplate would be supersession by democracy. Yet whether we should not too greatly compromise democracy in Germany by forcing it upon the nation from without, is a question on which the most serious doubts must arise. The Allies would have to invite the help of the Socialist party, and request German democrats to take up the task of working out the plan of the democratic constitution. If they refused, the difficulty would be greatly increased; if they responded, they might make themselves the mark for bitter attacks and the accusation of aiding the country's enemies. If, however, by the time peace is made there is a great revulsion of feeling, and a democratic constitution is desired by the majority of the people, the Allies might break down the obstacles to a free choice by the people of their future system of government. To take such a step would be in harmony with the declarations frequently made, that we are at war not with Germany, but with German militarism. But the result, good or bad, would have to be accepted in good faith.

We have, lastly, the view of the man in the street —that when the war is over responsibility for making the war shall be brought home to its authors, and that fitting punishment shall be imposed on them personally, however highly placed; and that where

the guilt of violations of the Conventions of War is traced home to the actual perpetrators or to those who gave the orders, the guilty persons shall be justly dealt with. Personally, I wish it might be so, and I can imagine no more salutary action. But I do not expect in my time to see Emperors and Ministers and Generals made to pay the penalty of their crimes, like ordinary citizens, any more than I expect to see the lord who steals the common from the goose serve his term with the vagabond who steals the goose from the common.

I conclude, therefore, that the best guarantee against a war of revenge will be a continuance of the present Alliance, with the addition of such Powers, at present neutral, as may seek admission, and towards Germany a policy of justice, tempered, not overpowered, by mercy—peace being preceded by a victory so complete that the Hohenzollern dynasty and the existing system of government may be seriously discredited, and the delusion of German invincibility destroyed.

LECTURE VI

THE FUTURE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

"A *dog* starved at his master's gate
Predicts the ruin of the State."

HAVING thus attempted a wide, though cursory, review of the perspective of past wars, and some examination of the problems of the present crisis, have we, as a result, obtained any new light or wider vision of the possibilities of building up international peace, and of the essential elements of the right policy to that end? I think we have.

On the balance of force for peace or war, we have this main conclusion: that while war breeds war, so that the period after the termination of a war, from the time that there is some recovery from the exhaustion, and while still the angry feelings and the irritation from new conditions imposed by the peace are unabated, is the period of maximum peril, yet from the point of view of the general evolution of society the forces for peace are continually growing. Though States widen their boundaries, yet the geographical radius of any individual person's interests extends far more rapidly. Less and less can any nation preserve an independent economic life. In the very elementary function of feeding and clothing its

population, it is part of one world-wide system of production, transport, and exchange. It is the same with regard to the higher activities of man. It was more or less reasonable for Euripides to talk about Hellenic culture in contrast with foreign barbarism. To adopt a similar attitude to-day, and to talk about British or French or German culture is to talk about what does not exist. In reality, there is nothing more than British, French, and German contributions to a common world-culture, and British, French, and German assimilations from the common stock. And while each nation may take an honourable pride in its own contributions, when it examines them it cannot find any which are exclusively its own, for each worker starts from results already achieved, which men of all nations have helped to attain. The active-minded citizen of any advanced nation can no longer be thought of in terms of his relation to his city and to his nation merely. All round him there are organizations—religious, economic, scientific, propagandist—which appeal to him to link himself with others in many countries who share with him some particular common interest. This is not only the case with the "intellectuals." Trade-unionism is rapidly becoming more and more international, so is co-operation. Free libraries make the writings of the most famous authors of the world accessible to very humble readers. Certain difficulties in carrying on the war against which many people have chafed; the enormous number of "enemy aliens" in each belligerent, and in all the more important neutral

countries; the awkwardness to Governments of the problem of dealing with them; the great number of men, and still more of wives, whose real nationality, as determined by their sympathies, it is impossible to ascertain—all these illustrate the cardinal fact that a social organization of human beings is proceeding, which ignores State frontiers, and which is entirely out of harmony with international war. The outbreak of war violently severs or strains millions of personal bonds between individuals—which should enable us to realize that those personal bonds were there, and that they have been rapidly multiplying and growing stronger.

If we take the results of our examination on the other side—the state of the forces making for war, grouped under the four heads of Economic, Religious, Political, and Sociological—we find the outlook on the whole encouraging and reassuring. Hunger wars, wars springing from biological necessity for Europe and Asia, were ended by the Russian conquest of the Steppes of Tartary; and though there are groups of capitalists and financers who can make profits out of wars, and out of Imperialistic adventures which may lead to wars, such profits are insignificant compared with the losses that fall upon the whole body of the owners of the world's accumulated stores of wealth. In the field of religion, the centuries of wars of the Cross and the Crescent are almost to their end; and the balance of the power of ethical appeal for peace over that for war is increasing more rapidly than at any previous time in the world's history. There re-

main the political conflicts of rival nationalities and empires—what we may call the stupid egotisms of corporate personalities of the political order; and also the sinister power wielded by the very organizations which nations have created for their defence, but which are necessarily offensive as well as defensive. On this side the force making for war is as great or greater than ever. Nevertheless, taking the process of social evolution as a whole, the pacific force is relatively strengthening, the war force weakening.

Translating this estimate of the general situation into terms of policy, we have the three following lines of action indicated:

1. Time being on the side of peace, and the forces for peace in most countries, *if only they were organized*, being more powerful than those for war, at the worst it is always worth while to struggle for the postponement of an "inevitable" war.

2. But the main struggle must be to create an international morality, and to

3. Win for society as a whole the power of controlling its belligerent organs.

1. *The Postponement of War.*—As I write, exactly a hundred years have passed since the day of Napoleon's return from Elba, which was followed within a few weeks by Waterloo. How many times during that hundred years has not war between Britain and France been "inevitable"? Our Volunteers were organized to meet a French invasion; our forts in the South of England were built for that purpose; for

the greater part of the hundred years it was against France that we built our Navy; but, in spite of Siam and Fashoda and many forgotten issues, the "inevitable" war has been postponed with such success that it has ceased to be "inevitable," and to-day is nothing more than an ugly and improbable nightmare. The value of postponement was the guiding principle with Sir Edward Grey in his negotiations for the averting of the present war, and it was also fully understood by those who made the war. They hurried forward the crisis with all possible speed for that very reason. The United States has recognized the same fact in its last series of arbitration treaties characterized by "the cooling-off clause."

2. *International Morality.*—I have previously alluded to the doctrine that there is no place for morality in international relations, that there is nothing above the State, and that each State has the right to pursue its own aggrandizement irrespective of the rights or interests of others and regardless of its own plighted word. I do not wish to enter into any philosophic argument on the theory; intellectually, the mere fact that no State can live a separate life seems to me to demonstrate its absurdity. What I am concerned with is the tendency, growing or disappearing, of States to act upon it.

We have to recognize that, as a matter of fact, the prevailing level of morality of State action in international relations is appallingly low. Our own record for the past sixty years includes the Crimean War, Chinese opium wars, Afghan and Zulu Wars, the

bombardment of Alexandria, the Soudan War, the South African War. There are, of course, varying opinions about each of these; there is one, but only one, of them which I personally should be prepared to defend before an international audience. Nor has our inaction been much more honourable than our action. We deserted Denmark in 1864; we made no efforts to mitigate the conditions imposed by Prussia on France in 1871; our support of the Turkish tyranny was shortsighted and cynical; and our efforts to secure the execution of reforms in Macedonia and Armenia timid in the extreme—and so on. To foreign observers the professions that were uniformly made that we were acting from the highest motives, out of respect for treaties, from necessary self-defence, desire for peace, or for the general well-being of humanity, must seem like the most odious hypocrisies, designed to serve selfish ends by deceiving those whom it was our supposed interest to outwit. But in reality it was not so. To a certain extent all these alleged motives were real factors, though perhaps lamentably feeble ones, in the make-up of British policy; and, to the extent that they were hypocritical, they were designed to deceive our own people, *who did desire that the conduct of the State towards other nations should be just, honourable, and humane.*

Now, whether the British Empire, as a State, has in its international relations behaved better or worse than the average of contemporary States, all circumstances being taken into consideration, must be left

to the judgment of historians of the distant future. But what is true of our record is generally true of theirs also. The binding power of any higher morality when in direct conflict with what is supposed to be the interest of the State has been small, but very rarely has it appeared non-existent. And it is clear that in the judgment of humanity to-day, when a nation openly declares its complete repudiation of moral obligations to the rest of the world, it is regarded as suffering from a sort of collective insanity. The result is that the State so suffering morally is doomed also to suffer materially.

Now, this is true in a special degree for the British Empire. If we never realized this before we ought to realize it now. The very right of the Empire to exist has been rudely challenged. When we can look back and carefully review the progress of events, we shall see by what a narrow margin it has been saved, and that it owes its continued existence not only to the might of the Fleet, to the valour of the Army, and the success of the action taken by the Government, but primarily to the verdict pronounced upon it by neutral nations and by subject nationalities within the Empire. Germany disregarded Sir Edward Grey's warnings because she believed that, when challenged, the British Empire would crumble into dust. She believed that there would be civil war in Ireland, a widespread rebellion in India, a rally to the Holy War for Islam in Egypt, a practically unanimous rising of the Boers in Africa, and a cutting of the painter by Canada and

Australia. She believed, also, that neutral nations would desire to see the supremacy of the sea pass from Britain. In all these hopes she was disappointed. But they were not all unreasonable or improbable hopes, and if any one had been realized the balance of force in the great struggle would have been altered incalculably. And in some of these quarters a very slight transfer of opinion from our favour to our disfavour would have turned the scale. The world has given its verdict in favour of the continued existence of the British Empire, but not in too enthusiastic terms. We might read it as saying, "Better Britain than Germany, however bad Britain may be"; or, at best, "This and better may do."

We have, in fact, to make up our minds that justice, understanding, and sympathy must be the very lifeblood of the Empire. In order that there may be strength at the centre, in these islands we must have more economic and social justice between classes and between the sexes, otherwise there will be growing disunion and, all too probably, a progressive decay in the very physical vitality of our people. There must be more justice, in particular, for the peoples of India; and, in order that there may be justice, a much more effective understanding of Indian problems. Signs of marked progress in this direction one has been glad to notice in recent years. Lastly, the principle of justice must be much more keenly pursued in our relations with those nations whose strength is negligible compared with

our own. Though for very existence the British Empire must adopt justice as a policy, it will not suffice that it should do so only from prudential motives. In that case, at every crisis shortsighted views of what was prudent would prevail. There must be a deliberate training of those who are to exercise authority in the love of justice and fair play, and the obvious place for this training is in the school and the playing-field.

The example of the British Empire, when guided by a clearly grasped truth, is likely, after the conclusion of the present war, to exercise a dominating influence over Russian policy, and we can see very easily what a relief to international strain and general appeasement of the human mind would result from a resolve of the Czar's Government to treat with justice and understanding and sympathy Finland, Poland, and Persia, not forgetting the Russian peasant and workman. The effect of British example will be enhanced if the policy be continued—a policy which seems in itself prudent and natural—of continuing to knit more closely the Anglo-Franco-Russian Entente. Judging from Sir Edward Grey's declaration in 1913 that, while welcoming new friendships, he would not sacrifice old ones to get them, this is likely to be the policy of the immediate future. Oxford University might well assist by arranging for Rhodes scholarships to be held in future by Russian instead of German students. Further, all those measures of economic co-operation suggested above in connection with Mr. Wells's

Tariff war proposal form a natural supplement to that diplomatic policy.

It is, however, necessary that Sir Edward Grey's declaration should be read backwards as well—that while holding fast to existing friendships we also welcome new ones. It being clearly understood that the Triple Entente is to persist, we must aim at a wider understanding.

One of the ideas that has been brought forward, and has been very earnestly discussed in many circles, is that the first preliminary steps towards "the United States of Europe" shall be taken a few years after the conclusion of peace. As the result of discussion in different circles, the fundamental idea has probably been hammered into a great variety of forms. Where I myself joined in the discussion, it was agreed that the limitation to Europe was undesirable and impracticable, and the majority endorsed the proposal that at the fitting time there should be called a council representative of the great European Powers, together with the United States and Japan, not excluding the later admission of other States, with the hope that this council should be continually performing modest but useful functions, securing to itself the delegation of fuller and fuller powers, and thus become an effective organ of the common will of humanity, and exercise a powerful moral restraint over individual States.

Among the functions which it was suggested such a council might exercise were—(1) Dealing with the difficult problems arising from the confusion of racial

and language boundaries in the south-eastern corner of Europe, and with those arising from the liquidation of the Turkish Empire; (2) international postal arrangements; (3) international labour legislation; (4) the registration of international treaties when not secret, and such penalizing or moral condemnation of secret treaties as may be found practicable. It would seem to be suggested by analogy that as soon as such a council was formed and began to act, its powers would grow from year to year.

3. *The Whole Community and its Organization for War.*—We have next to deal with the essence of the power of militarism. It lies in the circumstances symbolized by the fact that in every great national pageant, like the coronation or the funeral of a King, only the slightest recognition is granted to all the peaceful activities of the nation which fill up the lives and interests of the great bulk of the population, and the cortège consists almost exclusively of soldiers and diplomats. Kings, foreign Ministers, chiefs of the Army, chiefs of the Navy, diplomats—these form a circle in the closest touch with one another, in a certain measure of isolation, removed to a great extent from the influence of the best thought of the world, and determining for each nation whether it shall or shall not close in deadly struggle with its neighbour. Outside these circles but close by, ready to be admitted into partial consultation, are the great financial houses which are prepared to mortgage the accumulations of the past and the productions of the future for the purposes of

present destruction, and the firms of armament-makers who sell the instruments of slaughter at a profit of ten to twenty per cent., and the newspapers by which the passions of the people can be played upon.

Because the nations desire peace, will these governing circles also desire peace?

If the diplomats and military chiefs do not desire peace, how can the nations which do restrain them?

Liberal and Labour politicians have been asking these questions for many years in all European countries. Answering the first question in the negative, they have devised various policies in answer to the second.

In Germany the Social Democratic party habitually voted against the Budget, without any perceptible result. In England, on similar lines, agitations have been carried on against increases in the Army and Navy estimates. Here, again, it is hard to see that anything has been gained. More and more, the current of democratic thought has been turned into the direction of popular control of the diplomats and of the foreign policy of the country.

Here again, I believe, they will encounter a difficulty and a danger that requires to be faced. The difficulty arises from the fact that our constitutional organ for exercising popular control over Government is the House of Commons, and the House of Commons, by the working of the party system and by the morbid and dangerous development of party spirit in the country, has made itself practically in-

capable of putting any check on the Executive, and morally unfit for the task of lifting foreign relations into a higher and serener atmosphere. A necessary preliminary to giving the House of Commons more control over foreign policy should be a curbing of the excesses of party spirit and a weakening of the shackles of party discipline by the adoption of Proportional Representation. And then it would be necessary to wait to see the result of that.

But behind this difficulty there lies an even more serious danger, in the lack of the necessary knowledge and intellectual training among people of all classes. This is partly due to the fact that popular education is mainly devoted to increasing efficiency for wage-earning, and that it is somewhat scanty and inefficient at that; and partly to the criminal obscurantism of those estimable country clergy who refuse to allow the ancient Universities to abolish compulsory Greek, and thus divorce education from modern life for the public schools, and consequently for all those who have the opportunity of a prolonged education. Valuable as are the efforts of those who are building up systems of higher education among the people, these are only by degrees leavening the mass. It is only slowly that they are making possible the future democratic control of international politics.

Meanwhile, a proposal has been made which seems to me, after turning it over and over, to offer a great hope; it is that there shall be established, by voluntary association, an International Court of Honour. It should exercise no military or financial force; it

should operate only through the power of public opinion. It should ascertain facts, and declare them. It would not have to wait till both nations at controversy with one another consented to refer the dispute to it. Directly one party, the weaker presumably, appealed to it, it could begin to examine the case as presented, and invite the antagonist also to put its case; if it refused, the inference would be easy. The helplessness of the great mass of pacific public opinion, the opinion of those who pay the taxes, who suffer the toils and the wounds of campaigns, the widows and orphans left destitute, arises from their ignorance. If they had for their organ a judicial tribunal, of men of high honour and great capacity, selected for each international dispute from neutral nations, declaring where lay the justice of the issue, or how it might be compromised with honour to both sides, their confusion and uncertainty and helplessness would disappear. They would find a common voice, and they would make it heard. I have searched, but have failed to find any sufficient reason for thinking this proposal impracticable, or the Court it contemplates likely to be corrupted or perverted.

In conclusion, there is a question which citizens of the United Kingdom must needs put very seriously to themselves. We say we are at war against Prussian militarism: the Prussians answer that they are at war against British navalism. To our minds, "Britannia rules the waves" generally carries no more meaning than that the British Fleet is the greatest and most powerful on the ocean, and that it

guards our shores and the oversea trade without which we should starve. To the German it means that the British Fleet arrogates to itself the right to make war upon all their shipping, and to seize the cargoes, irrespective of their nature; and that it is only by permission, that can be revoked at any time, that German commerce can pass on water outside the narrow limits of the Baltic Sea. This is the question, technically, "of the right of capture of private goods at sea." The general opinion of the world is in favour of the abolition of that right, except for contraband of war. Britain asserts it, and therefore maintains it for all other navies as well as her own. By this right, as Mr. Gibson Bowles says, we have in the past been able "to coerce not a nation only, but a whole continent." This it is that adds weight to the German argument in America and elsewhere, when they endeavour to rouse suspicion and distrust against us. It is almost impossible for us to wish now, while this war lasts, that our Navy had any less freedom of action. But should we succeed, in Mr. Asquith's words, in wholly and finally destroying Prussian military domination, we must face the question, whether in foreign eyes our naval policy does not bear the appearance of a national arrogance similar to that of Prussia. That this right should be abandoned has been long advocated by Lord Loreburn, and for a good many years by Mr. F. E. Smith. Sir Edward Grey's policy at the last Hague Conference appears to have been to offer to take this momentous step if Germany would

agree to a limitation of navies. But Germany rejected this offer which, we can now see, would have been of enormous advantage to her. The question lies dormant during the war; when the war is over it will inevitably be raised again, and in very powerful quarters. Then we shall have to decide whether we shall not offer up the right of capture as our sacrifice upon the altar of the world's peace. It will be a sacrifice—a sacrifice of power, founded on naval strength—but to make that sacrifice may be the highest wisdom.

What are regarded here as the necessary means for securing the permanence of peace—the pursuit of justice in national, imperial and international affairs, a revision of University education, the abatement of Party rancour, the abandonment of a formidable naval weapon—are no small matters. To some it may seem hopeless to make such demands from those who determine the policy of the nation.

It would be hopeless, perhaps, if the nation is to be, at the conclusion of the war, much as it was before the war began. But two great changes are to be anticipated. *After* the war is quite over we shall *begin* to realize what modern war is—and not till then. That realization will be the spur driving us to the accomplishment of all that we understand to be necessary for the future maintenance of peace. And, secondly, the decision of national issues will be in the hands of women as well as men. For while the advance of women towards political power has in the past been slow in the extreme, it has been

irresistible, and steadily accelerating. The war itself has made all Europe realize that in the supreme struggle between nations, survival depends upon the energies of women being utilized as well as those of men; and women who have left sheltered homes to face stern responsibilities and difficult duties will not easily return to a vapid existence. Henceforward they will count; and they will count more and more, though it is not yet possible to see whether complete political equality between the sexes will ever be established.

Now, while there has been in some quarters gross exaggeration with regard to the difference between men and women in their outlook on peace and war—and argument from natural differences in function is partially misleading for reasons shown in Lecture II. —yet beyond a doubt there is a difference, and the inevitable advance of Feminism is the world's best security against the destruction of civilization by international war.

ADDENDUM

THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF HONOUR

In such time for thought as men have to spare from the problem of carrying on the most deadly war the world has seen, they are gripped by the question, whether there is any possibility of preventing even greater and more terrible wars in the future, which would be waged with weapons enormously developed in death-dealing power, and all too probably utterly destroy the world's civilization, already so sorely damaged. This is surely the greatest question that ever confronted humanity. It is not a question to argue about, but one for individual and collective thinking; for the most strenuous thought that each individual can compass, and the clearest exposition of whatever result is reached.

There are some who hold that there is no possibility of such an avoidance of war. There are others who almost hope that the realization of what this war is will of itself induce nations to prevent wars and live together in peace, and, by degrees, in amity. Between these two extremes different thinkers hold all sorts of intermediate positions, but there is one conclusion which seems to me to be forcing itself into a very wide acceptance—the conclusion that as long as the different sovereign States into which the world is divided are under no control, and in no way subject, either materially or morally, to some Power representing humanity as a whole, peace can be at the best precarious. When the prospect seems

fairest and the sky most untroubled, the volcanic forces beneath will ever be ready to burst forth with redoubled violence.

If this be so, the problem of peace is the problem of creating this wider authority. It is no easy problem, for how can it be created, except by the combined will of the sovereign States themselves? And when did any entirely independent and self-govering political units of their own free will create a superior authority and voluntarily submit themselves to it? According to Hobbes and other theorists, States themselves were created by such a process; free and independent individual men, being under no authority, and finding out by dire experience the perils and miseries of anarchy, created the State by selecting a Prince, and contracting to give him obedience for the sake of law and order. But no one supposes that such theories contain any positive historic truth. If history of the evolution of government over individuals can offer us any guidance for the problem of humanity to-day, it suggests that the new super-State authority cannot be suddenly established in its final form. In other words, it suggests that something may be created independently of the volition of sovereign States, which may be subsequently accepted by them, and ultimately grow into a Power great enough to prevent wars, and to settle international issues on just principles.

It is on these lines that the proposal for an International Court of Honour has been conceived. The idea is that it shall be created in the first place by a voluntary international association, with a constitution framed to give as real and equal representation to all members as possible; and that this association shall, when appealed to *by either party* in any international difficulty, appoint as assessors the ablest and most impartial men whose services can be

secured, and these assessors shall investigate the issue, inviting both parties to submit their case, and declaring what, in their opinion, the justice of the quarrel was. It would not, in the proper sense of the word, make an award like a Court of Arbitration, and therefore no question would arise as to whether its award would be accepted. What it would do would be to *enlighten public opinion throughout the world*. Yet the mere fact that nations find it worth while now to appeal to general public opinion shows that the International Court of Honour would exercise a very real force. That force would grow just in proportion to the weight, enlightenment, and justice of its pronouncements; and, therefore, since all human organizations have in themselves a force working for their own existence and growth, the Association for maintaining the International Court of Honour would strive continually to uphold its prestige by appointing for each inquiry the most authoritative Court it could discover and induce to serve.

The Court of Honour would not be confined to questions at issue between Governments. One of its most important functions would be to exercise a control over the diffusion of false and misleading statements in the world's Press if of a character to aggravate international relations. To take a particular example: In the period immediately preceding the South African War, public opinion in Great Britain was inflamed by statements, circulated very widely and with the greatest prominence, that two Englishmen had been unwarrantably put to death by the Transvaal Government. Actually, they had not even received any physical injury. It would be the function of the International Court of Honour in such circumstances, on complaint from any Government maligned in the Press of a foreign country, to invite the newspaper concerned to justify

its statement, and if it failed or refused to make the attempt, to publish the fact to the world. Similarly, private individuals, associations, and corporations would have the right of appealing to the Court of Honour against stigmas laid upon them by State officials if the case had an international character, and was outside the cognizance of all other Courts. Of the various developments of the Court, of its possible extension into internal affairs where what is most important is to ascertain and publish facts, as frequently is the case in labour disputes, it is not necessary to speculate here.

The International Court of Honour, while resting on the power of public opinion, would enormously increase that power. Public opinion is, under present conditions, rendered relatively powerless by the lack of independent access to the facts; it is confused and puzzled; whatever information comes before it is reasonably suspected of being evoked for some particular end, but what that end may be few people are in a position to guess. From such shackles it would be freed, to a great extent, by the Court.

Many doubts will arise with regard to this proposal. First, it will be asked whether there is power in the world for its creation. The answer is that the supreme interest of most people is international peace, and among this great majority there are thousands of men of great wealth and influence. If they believe that the International Court of Honour will have the influence which is hoped for it, it will be common sense on their part to see that it is created.

Secondly, it will be asked whether the Governments of States will allow such a power to be formed independently of them, and to grow to such influence as to exercise any real control over their actions without being itself controlled by them. Frankly, I

do not believe that they will. But once a sufficiently powerful international association has been built up and has begun its work, the one effective move that they will be able to make against it *will be to compete with it*. They will naturally be moved to create an International Court on the principle of representation from sovereign States, and once this is established, there will be in existence the germ of a federal authority for the world as a whole.

Minor federal authorities, as those of the Swiss and American Federations, have grown up under the pressure of a common danger. The common danger exists, and grows ever more threatening and terrible, to impel the world, once the germ of the world-federal authority is there, to foster its growth and influence. And, just as in each nation the affairs of the Central Government draw from all over the country the most energetic minds from the service of localities and private businesses, so the World's Federal Court would draw to itself the ablest men from national Governments.

These, then, are the questions for which I crave consideration:

1. Can the world's peace be permanently secured except by the evolution of a super-national authority?

2. Can States be brought to acquiesce in the existence of such an authority, and to concede it sufficient power for effectiveness, unless the germ of it is created and fostered up to a certain point, independently of their volition?

3. Can any better way of creating the germ of the Confederation of the World be suggested than the International Court of Honour for the purpose of ascertaining truth, and investigating the application of the principle of justice, in issues between nations?

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